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I. INTRODUCTION
The Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability ("HIFA") waiver,
introduced in August 2001, has recently drawn criticism from health
advocates and government officials. Critics have expressed concern that
state HIFA waiver programs may abuse the Medicaid system by using
unspent federal State Children's Health Insurance Program ("SCHIP")
dollars to reduce overall benefit levels, increase cost-sharing, cover
childless adults rather than children, and limit enrollment in public
programs. Although these criticisms are noteworthy and merit discussion,
this paper aims to put the HIFA waiver into a more positive perspective.
Specifically, one could view the HIFA waiver as a vehicle to implement
collaborative governance schemes. Collaborative governance approaches
to designing health coverage expansion programs under the HIFA waiver
may address at least some of the concerns expressed by advocates and the
General Accounting Office ("GAO").
It should be noted that this paper does not necessarily support the
waiver's specific benefit and cost-sharing standards set by the Department
of Health and Human Services ("DHHS"). Nor does it address the specific
HIFA waiver programs states have already devised. Rather, this paper
focuses on the HIFA waiver's increased programmatic flexibility offered to
states and its emphasis on public-private coordination to expanding health
coverage. These two HIFA waiver characteristics offer states and other
health care stakeholders an opportunity to collaboratively design and
implement politically, economically, and socially viable solutions to reduce
the number of uninsured. This paper focuses on the need for collaborative
solutions, using the HIFA waiver as a vehicle for designing and
implementing those solutions.
J.D., M.P.H., Staff Attorney/Project Director, Center for Public Representation, Madison,
Wisconsin, the author can be contacted at: bjzabawa@law.wisc.edu.
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Collaborative governance should be an essential component in any HIFA
waiver proposal due to a health care system that is moving away from a
federal, hierarchical program design and implementation and moving
toward a more local, collaborative approach. After providing essential
background information about the HIFA waiver in Part II, this paper will
introduce the collaborative governance model in Part Ill. Part IV of this
paper will provide several reasons why HIFA waiver proposals compel
collaboration among stakeholders. In particular, collaborative governance
should be an essential component of HIFA waiver proposals because
current stakeholder projects and coalitions show health system reform
necessitates collaboration. Collaboration may overcome barriers to health
expansion program success, such as stakeholder buy-in, notice, and state
access to private health coverage information.
Furthermore, collaboration within the context of the HIFA waiver
process may maximize the strengths of current collaborations, such as
providing: access to greater and more stable funding sources; access to a
facilitator that can collect and distribute data; and an avenue for
accountability. Part V of this paper discusses challenges in ensuring
collaborative governance success under the HIFA waiver and provides
some suggestions for meeting those challenges. Such challenges include:
involving health care consumer advocates; designing a program that is local
enough to achieve stakeholder support; and convincing government
agencies to adopt and support collaborative models in HIFA waiver
initiatives. This paper concludes that if states were to adopt a truly
collaborative approach when designing and implementing programs under
the HIFA waiver, there may be hope in expanding and improving health
coverage, since collaboration is the most appropriate mechanism to address
the complexity of health system reform.
II. HIFA WAIVER BACKGROUND
The new HIFA waiver, introduced in August 2001, is a type of Medicaid
and SCHIP section 1115 waiver.' "Section 1115, as applied to Medicaid,
essentially allows [DHHS] to provide federal Medicaid matching funds to a
state that is providing coverage that does not meet federal minimum
standards or that extends beyond available federal options.",2 The HIFA
1. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1) (2000) (stating that "the Secretary may waive
compliance with any of the requirements of section... 1396a of this title ... to the extent
and for the period he finds necessary to enable such State... to carry out such project").
Section 1396a of the Social Security Act outlines "State plans for medical assistance," and
discusses or references eligibility, service and cost-sharing criteria. 42 U.S.C. §§
1396a(a)(l0)(A) (2000), (a)(14) (2000).
2. CINDY MANN, THE KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, THE NEW
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waiver emphasizes public-private health insurance integration or
coordination and offers states greater flexibility with respect to benefit
design and cost-sharing levels.' The primary goal of the HIFA waiver is to
encourage states to find innovative ways to expand health insurance
coverage within current federal spending levels. Although states are free to
expand coverage to any income group, the waiver encourages states to
focus on individuals with incomes below 200% of the federal poverty level
("FPL"). HIFA demonstration projects may cover the following
population categories: mandatory (i.e., children under age six and pregnant
women up to 133% of the FPL); optional (i.e., such as children covered in
Medicaid or SCHIP above the mandatory levels and parents covered under
Medicaid); and expansion (i.e., childless and non-disabled adults).6
In the same spirit as the SCHIP legislation, the HIFA waiver encourages
states to coordinate public insurance coverage with private insurance
coverage.7 In particular, the HIFA waiver requires states to implement
premium assistance programs, even if only as a pilot program.8 Premium
assistance programs use public funds to subsidize enrollee purchase of
private coverage by enrollees rather than directly enrolling them in
MEDICAID AND CHIP WAIVER INITIATIVES 11 (2002), http://www.kff.org/content/2002/
4028/4028.pdf.
3. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN.,
HEALTH INSURANCE FLEXIBILITY ACCOUNTABILITY DEMONSTRATION INITIATIVE, at
http://cms.hhs.gov/hifa/default.asp [hereinafter HCFA HIFA Article]. "Section 1115 of the
Social Security Act authorizes the executive branch of the Federal government to waive
statutory and regulatory provisions of major health and welfare programs under the Social
Security Act, including Medicaid and [S]CHIP." JEANNE LAMBREW, THE KAISER COMM'N
ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, SECTION 1115 WAIVERS IN MEDICAID AND THE STATE
CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2001),
http://www.kff.org/content/2001/4001/
4001 .pdf#pathways.
4. HCFA HIFA Article, supra note 3.
5. Id. Currently, 200% of the federal poverty level is equivalent to a family of three
earning $2,503.33 per month. WIS. DEP'T OF HEALTH & FAMILY SERVS., FEDERAL POVERTY
LEVEL GUIDELINES (FPL) (effective May 2002), at http://www.dhfs.state.wi.us/medicaidl/
fpl/fpl.htm.
6. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Guidelines for States Interested in
Applying for a HIFA Demonstration, at http://cms.hhs.gov/hifa/hifagde.asp [hereinafter
HIFA Guidelines].
7. Id. SCHIP legislation encourages coordination between public and private health
insurance programs. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1397bb(b)(3)(C) (2000) (stating that states
should submit a plan to DHHS describing how the state's proposed SCHIP program will
"not substitute for coverage under group health plans"); 42 U.S.C. § 1397bb(c)(2) (2000)
(stating that states should submit a plan to DHHS describing how the state will coordinate
the SCHIP program with "other public and private health insurance programs").
8. THE KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, THE NEW MEDICAID AND
CHIP WAIVERS 22-23 (2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter KFF CHIP Waiver Article].
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Medicaid or SCHIP-funded programs. 9 The HIFA waiver's feature of
public-private partnership through premium assistance programs supports
the notion that expanding health care coverage to the working poor is a
complex endeavor, because many of these workers have access to some
form of health insurance.' ° Thus, there may be some conflict between the
private and public programs. However, health coverage offerings in the
low-income workplace are increasingly unaffordable or unavailable
altogether, particularly for part-time and other "peripheral" workers." The
risk of un-insurance is "spreading up the income ladder and deep into the
ranks of those with full-time jobs."' 2  Premium assistance programs
potentially provide greater continuity of coverage for low to moderate-
income workers. Even though the amount of public subsidy provided in
premium assistance programs may fluctuate with the amount of private
coverage available to low-wage workers, workers could maintain some
level of health coverage despite a change in their employment status. 1
3
Unlike the previous Medicaid and SCHIP section 1115 waivers, the
HIFA waiver promotes premium assistance programs by eliminating
specific cost effectiveness tests.' 4 However, each state must monitor such
programs to ensure costs are not "significantly" higher than costs would be
if an enrollee were insured directly through a public program."5 In addition,
DHHS will be more flexible with respect to benefits and cost-sharing in
9. Id. at 22; EDWIN PARK & LEIGHTON Ku, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
ADMINISTRATION MEDICAID AND SCHIP WAIVER POLICY ENCOURAGES STATES TO SCALE
BACK BENEFITS SIGNIFICANTLY AND INCREASE COST-SHARING FOR LOW-INCOME
BENEFICIARIES 3 (2001).
10. John V. Jacobi, Symposium: Medicaid Expansion, Crowd Out, and Limits of
Incremental Reform, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 79, 112 (2001).
11. /d.at112-13.
12. John M. Broder, Problem of Lost Health Benefits is Reaching Into the Middle Class,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/l 1/25/national/25INSU.html.
13. Jacobi, supra note 10, at 115.
14. PARK & KU, supra note 9, at 9.
15. Id. Under the pre-HIFA section 1115 demonstration waivers, if states implement
premium assistance programs, they are required to prove enrollment in employer-based
coverage is cost effective and that the beneficiaries have the same benefits and cost-sharing
protections that they would have in the regular Medicaid program. KFF CHIP Waiver
Article, supra note 8, at 4 App.. A premium assistance program is determined to be "cost
effective" if the cost of the premium assistance is no greater than the cost of covering the
enrollee under the regular Medicaid or SCHIP program. PARK & Ku, supra note 9, at 9. If
the private health insurance coverage fails to provide the same benefits provided under the
Medicaid program, then the state must pay for wrap-around benefits in the premium
assistance program. Id. It should be noted, however, that even under HIFA waiver
demonstration projects, the entire project (of which the premium assistance program is a
part) must meet budget neutrality requirements. HIFA Guidelines, supra note 6. That is,
over the life of the project, federal funding must not increase over what would have been
spent under current program requirements. Id.
[Vol. 12
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premium assistance programs, which means states do not have to provide
wrap-around coverage as they have in the past.
6
The HIFA waiver allows states more discretion in establishing benefit
and cost-sharing structures for optional and expansion populations, but not
for mandatory populations.' 7 With mandatory populations, states must
continue to follow the cost-sharing and benefit guidelines specified in Title
XIX of the Social Security Act. 8 The HIFA waiver lowers the benefit
16. Interview with Don Schneider, Chief of Coordination of Benefits Section, DHFS, in
Madison, Wis. (Feb. 23, 2001) (indicating that cost-effectiveness is measured by comparing
the cost of a BadgerCare participant enrolled in a HMO with the cost of wrap-around
coverage and extra administrative costs provided in the HIPP program). See also KFF CHIP
Waiver Article, supra note 8, at 23.
17. HIFA Guidelines, supra note 6. Although pre-HIFA section 1115 waivers would
have allowed states more flexibility in adjusting benefit and cost-sharing structures, a dearth
of such proposals is more likely a reflection of the Clinton Administration's emphasis on
preservation and enhancement of beneficiary access to quality services, as well as lower
rates of health care inflation in the 1990s. See LAMBREW, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that
while the Clinton Administration encouraged state section 1115 demonstration, it rejected
proposals that did not promote its' policy objectives of extending medical savings accounts
to low-income persons and using beneficiary cost-sharing to replace state spending).
18. HJFA Guidelines, supra note 6. Current Medicaid law requires states to provide
certain benefits to mandatory populations and limits beneficiary cost-sharing. Id. For
example, to be eligible for federal funds, states are required to provide Medicaid coverage
"for most individuals who receive Federally assisted income maintenance payments, as well
as for related groups not receiving cash payments." CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY, at http://cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/eligibility/criteria.asp
[hereinafter CMS Medicaid brochure]. These mandatory groups include: (a) low income
families with children, as described in section 1931 of the Social Security Act (SSA), who
meet certain eligibility requirements in the State's AFDC plan in effect on July 16, 1996 (for
example, in Wisconsin, a family would fall in this category if their income ranged from
$31 1/month for one individual to $1099/month for eight individuals, or between 45% to 59%
of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL); (b) Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients; (c)
infants born to Medicaid-eligible pregnant women; (d) children under age six and pregnant
women whose family income is at or below 133% of the FPL and to children under age
nineteen who were born after Sept. 30, 1983 and are in families with incomes at or below the
FPL; (e) recipients of adoption and foster care assistance under Title IV-E of the SSA; (f)
certain Medicare beneficiaries; and (g) certain individuals transitioning off Medicaid. Id.;
RACHEL CARABELL & RICHARD MEGNA, LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
AND BADGERCARE, INFORMATIONAL PAPER #43, 4 (2001); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(a)(i)
(2000). States may also receive federal matching funds for covering other "categorically
needy" and "medically needy" groups. CMS Medicaid brochure, supra note 18; 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(10)(a)(ii) (2000). The optional categorically needy groups share characteristics of
the mandatory groups, "but the eligibility criteria are somewhat more liberally defined."
CMS Medicaid brochure, supra note 18. The categorically needy group includes: (a) infants
up to age one and pregnant women not covered under the mandatory rules with income
below 185% FPL; (b) certain aged, blind, or disabled adults with higher incomes than those
in mandatory populations but still below the FPL; (c) low-income children under age twenty-
one; (d) low-income institutionalized individuals or those who would be institutionalized but
receive care under home and community-based waivers; (e) recipients of State
supplementary payments; (f) low-income TB-infected persons; and (g) low-income,
uninsured women who need treatment for breast and cervical cancer. Id. The optional
2003]
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standards available to optional Medicaid groups, which includes: optional
categorically needy and optional medically needy.' 9
Traditionally, Medicaid law has required that the following types of
services be provided to optional categorically needy groups:
(a) hospital services;
(b) physician services;
(c) medical and surgical dental services;
(d) nursing and home health services;
(e) family planning services and supplies;
(f) rural clinic services;
(g) laboratory and x-ray services;
(h) pediatric and family nurse practitioner services;
(i) federally-qualified ambulatory services;
(j) nurse-midwife services; and
(k) early and periodic screening diagnosis and treatment ("EPSDT")
services for individuals under age twenty-one.20
Optional medically needy populations are required to receive only the
following services:
(a) prenatal care and delivery for pregnant women;
(b) ambulatory services for those under eighteen or entitled to
institutional care;
(c) home health to those entitled to nursing facility care; and
(d) if the state plan includes services in institutions for mental diseases,
the state must offer a number of similar services as offered to the
categorically needy population.2
medically needy group extends eligibility to "qualified persons who may have too much
income to qualify under the mandatory or optional categorically needy groups." Id. As a
result, those who are in the medically needy group can "spend down" to Medicaid eligibility
"by incurring medical and/or remedial care expenses to offset their excess income, thereby
reducing it to a level below the maximum allowed by that State's Medicaid plan." Id.
Benefits for those that qualify for Medicaid under the medically needy category may not be
as extensive, though in Wisconsin the benefits provided to the medically and categorically
needy populations are essentially the same. CARABELL & MEGNA, supra, at 3.
19. "All mandatory and most optional groups are 'categorically eligible.' A different
and more limited set of benefits can be provided to the optional 'medically needy' group."
KFF CHIP Waiver Article, supra note 8, at 8 n.9.
20. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID SERVS., http://cms.hhs.gov/
medicaid/mservice.asp [hereinafter CMS Medicaid Service Brochure].
21. Id. Specifically, "if the State plan includes services either in institutions for mental
diseases or in intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded (ICF/MRs), it must offer
either of the following to each of the medically needy groups: the services contained in 42
C.F.R. sections 440.10 through 440.50 and 440.165 (to the extent that nurse-midwives are
authorized to practice under State law or regulations); or the services contained in any seven
of the sections in 42 C.F.R. 440.10 through 440.165." Id. Sections 440.10 through 440.70
include such services as inpatient and outpatient hospital services, laboratory and x-ray
[Vol. 12
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In contrast, the HIFA waiver only requires states to provide the optional
population with basic services, such as hospital and physician services, lab
and x-ray services, and well-baby and well-child care. Beyond these basic
services, states have the flexibility to design the benefit package to parallel
one of the following types of plans:
(a) the benefit package that is offered by an HMO and has the largest
commercial, non-Medicaid enrollment in the State;
(b) the standard Blue Cross/Blue Shield preferred provider option
service benefit plan offered to Federal employees under 5 U.S.C.
section 8903(1);
(c) the plan offered to the state's employees;
(d) a benefit package actuarially equivalent to one of the aforementioned
plans; or
(e) a plan approved by the Secretary of DHHS.23
For expansion populations, the HIFA waiver will provide states even
greater flexibility in designing the benefit package.24 The primary
restrictions on state flexibility with regard to expansion populations are that
the state must provide these people a basic primary care package (i.e.,
health care services usually furnished by a general practitioner, family
physician, internal medicine physician, obstetrician/gynecologist, or
pediatrician) and the additional costs of the expansion must not increase
federal expenditures (i.e., be budget neutral).25
As for cost-sharing, the HIFA waiver grants states broad authority to
impose premiums, enrollment fees, deductibles and co-payments with
regard to optional and expansion groups. Cost-sharing for mandatory
groups continues to be limited to current Medicaid law.26 Except for
optional children, however, no cost-sharing limits will exist for optional and
services, nursing facility and home health services, physician and other medical professional
services (such as chiropractors). 42 C.F.R. §§ 440.10 -.70 (2002).
22. HCFA HIFA Article, supra note 3, at 3.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. KFF CHIP Waiver Article, supra note 8, at 22; HIFA Guidelines, supra note 6.
Current Medicaid law prohibits states from imposing enrollment fees or premiums on
categorically needy individuals for any services and ties such fees to gross income for
medically needy populations. 42 C.F.R. § 447.5 1(a) (2001). Current Medicaid law permits
states to charge either nominal deductibles, coinsurance, co-payment or similar charges on
categorically and medically needy people, except for services furnished: (a) to children
under eighteen; (b) to pregnant women (and the services are related to the pregnancy); (c) to
institutionalized individuals; (d) in an emergency; (e) for family planning purposes; and (f)
to HMO enrollees. 42 C.F.R. § 447.53(b) (2001). It should be noted that states can apply to
CMS to waive the "nominal" cost-sharing requirement for non-emergency services
furnished in a hospital emergency room. 42 C.F.R. § 447.54(b) (2001).
2003]
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expansion groups.27 For optional children, "total cost-sharing must not
exceed five percent of family income."28  This cost-sharing limit on
optional children does not include family premiums; that is, "if a state
covered the entire family, the premium to enroll the family would not be
counted towards the five percent cap on cost-sharing that would apply to
each child in the family. '29 It should be noted that DHHS will use premium
collections and other offsets to reduce overall program expenditures before
the state can claim federal matching funds. In exchange for following the
HIFA waiver guidelines, states are promised an efficient review process of
their waiver proposal.3
In essence, the HIFA waiver promises states more flexibility than
previous section 1115 waivers to ensure the sustainability of the private
health insurance system, while creating programs to reduce the number of
uninsured." However, this flexibility recently raised concern among
government officials, leading to a critical report by the GAO.33 The GAO
report focused on the questions: whether DHHS is acting outside the
authority of SCHIP by allowing states to use their unspent SCHIP funds to
cover uninsured adults; whether DHHS' authority under section 1115 of the
Social Security Act takes precedence over SCHIP's statutory objectives;
and whether the public is being adequately informed with regard to waiver
27. KFF CHIP Waiver Article, supra note 8, at 22.
28. Id. This five percent cap is similar to the cost-sharing cap for children enrolled in
separate child health insurance programs (not Medicaid expansion programs) through
SCHIP. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 457.560(a) (2001); 42 C.F.R. § 457.500(c) (2002).
29. KFF CHIP Waiver Article, supra note 8, at 22.
30. HCFA HIFA Article, supra note 3, at 7.
31. Id. at 1
32. Id.
33. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GAO-02-817, MEDICAID AND SCHIP
DEMONSTRATION WAIVERS 2 (2002) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. Senators Baucus and
Grassley requested the GAO to conduct a study of DHHS' waiver approval process. Letter
from Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary, DHHS, to Senator Max Baucus (May 6, 2002), at
http://www.healthlaw.org/pubs/waivers/thompson.response.pdf. General use of section 1115
waivers has also raised concerns. Because section 1115 waivers avert Congressional
approval, the executive branch can advance its policy agenda through these waivers.
LAMBREW, supra note 3, at 2-3. For example, the Clinton Administration explicitly sought
proposals to "preserve and enhance beneficiary access to quality services," but discouraged
proposals that would expand the use of medical savings accounts (MSAs) to low-income
people, or proposals that would increase beneficiary cost-sharing to replace state spending.
Id. The Bush Administration, however, is emphasizing public-private health insurance
coordination and permitting cost-sharing proposals through the HIFA waiver. KFF CHIP
Waiver Article, supra note 8, at 18. A former General Accounting Office Comptroller stated
that use of section 1115 demonstration to accomplish an administration goal "without
consultation and concurrence of the Congress does appear to be inappropriate." Lambrew,
supra note 3, at 2.
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program proposals.3" Specifically, the GAO argued that covering childless
adults is inconsistent with the objectives of SCHIP, which was enacted to
expand health coverage to low-income, uninsured children, and was
therefore outside its section 1115 authority. It argues that Section 1115
should promote "the objectives of the particular title of the Social Security
Act in which the waived program requirements or expenditure limitations
appear. "
The GAO also noted the inadequacy of public notice and comment in the
36HIFA waiver proposal process of some of the states. For example,
advocates in Utah complained that they had, "little or no opportunity to
formally comment on and influence the waiver proposal., 3' Arizona did
not release copies of its HIFA waiver proposal to the public until after it
was approved by DHHS.38 Therefore, the GAO recommended that
Congress amend SCHIP to specify that its funds should not be used to cover
childless adults, clarify which statutory objectives take precedence (those of
Title XXI or section 1115 authority), and require DHHS to improve the
public notification and input process at the federal level so interested parties
can review and comment on waiver proposals before approval.3 9
In response to the GAO's criticisms, DHHS noted that: allowing states to
cover uninsured adults under SCHIP meets the broad objectives of SCHIP
legislation, which is to cover those previously uninsured; 4 section 1115
provides DHHS considerable legal flexibility and therefore it is within the
agency's authority to determine how SCHIP funds should be used;4' and
public notice is adequate because HIFA waiver information is posted on
DHHS's website, and DHHS requires states to solicit public input in the
34. GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 5.
35. Id. at 17, 31. It should be noted that Senator Chuck Grassley, ranking member of the
Committee on Finance, stated that he plans to clarify that SCHIP funds "are meant to insure
children, not childless adults." Press Release, Senator Chuck Grassley, Welfare, Medicaid,
and SCHIP (Nov. 8, 2002), at http://grassley.senate.gov/releases/2002/p02rI 1-08.htm.
36. GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 27.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 28.
39. Id. at 31.
40. Id. at 5.
41. Id. at 16. Specifically, DHHS argues that "the language of section 1115 permits
approval of demonstration projects based on the overall purposes of all the listed Social
Security Act programs (rather than segregating each program)." Id. The GAO disagrees
with this interpretation of section 1115. Id. at 17. Specifically, "HHS's interpretation of
section 1115 effectively eliminates the distinctions among the programs authorized under the
identified titles of the Social Security Act and would allow the agency to waive requirements
or authorize otherwise impermissible expenditures under one program to promote the
objectives of any other program." Id.
2003]
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42waiver development process. Clearly there is disagreement between GAO
and DHHS about whether DHHS is stepping outside its congressional
authority in the HIFA waiver approval process. It is beyond the scope of
this paper to analyze which interpretation of section 1115 and SCHIP
legislation is correct. However, there is agreement among some health
policy experts that using Medicaid and SCHIP funding to expand health
coverage is a viable way to close the uninsured gap.43 These experts
suggest expanding Medicaid and SCHIP to "cover a broader range of
participants. "4 The remainder of this paper will operate under the
assumption that DHHS is acting within its congressional authority by
permitting states that apply for HIFA waivers to cover childless adults with
SCHIP funds.
In addition to criticism by government officials, health care consumer
advocates have expressed fear that state programs developed under the
HIFA waiver will actually decrease coverage. Specifically, these critics
worry that the HIFA waiver's flexibility, coupled with current state budget
crises, will result in benefit cuts, higher cost-sharing for optional and
expansion groups, or imposition of enrollment caps.4 ' Even if states did
expand coverage to additional groups, the advocates worry that this
coverage could be severely limited.
The HIFA waiver only requires that expansion groups receive basic
primary care, sustaining such groups' lack of access to medical specialists
and inpatient hospitalization. 46  Furthermore, increased cost-sharing by
optional and expansion groups could discourage those groups from
accessing medically necessary services. Critics of increased cost-sharing
point to research that indicates that cost-sharing "reduces utilization of
42. Id. at 25, 54.
43. Press Release, The National Academies News, Bold Initiatives Aim to Solve Key
Health Care Problems; Demonstration Projects Lay Foundation for Systemwide Reform
(Nov. 19, 2002), at http://www4.nationalacademies.org/news.nsf/isbn/
0309087074?OpenDocument [hereinafter National Academies Press Release] (stating that a
committee of health policy experts appointed by the Institute of Medicine believe that
several states should undertake model projects that would aim to provide universal
coverage). Currently, the U.S. has over 41 million people without health insurance. Id. See
also Robert Pear, Panel, Citing Health Care Crisis, Presses Bush to Act, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
19, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/l1/20/health/20HEAL.htm.
44. National Academies Press Release, supra note 43.
45. PARK & KU, supra note 9, at 1; MANN, supra note 2, at 1; NAT'L HEALTH LAW
PROGRAM, WHAT IS HIFA AND WHY SHOULD WE BE CONCERNED?,
http://www.healthlaw.org/waiver.shtml [hereinafter NHELP Brochure]. Specifically, with
regard to benefit cuts, optional beneficiaries, such as children above age six and disabled
individuals not receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI), may lose essential benefits
like long-term care or EPSDT services. PARK & Ku, supra note 9, at 5-6.
46. PARK & Ku, supra note 9, at 8-9.
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health care services" and has "a disproportionate effect on low-income
populations. 4 7 Finally, premium assistance programs would result in
higher costs to the government due to public funds substituting private
funds (i.e., "crowd out"). In particular, since the HIFA waiver eliminates
the cost-effectiveness requirement, employers with numerous low-wage
employees may be tempted to reduce their premium contribution knowing
that states could then increase premium funding to make up for the loss in
employer contribution.48
With concerns similar to those raised in the GAO Report, advocates
question whether the HIFA waiver is the appropriate vehicle to modify
federal statutory standards for coverage under Medicaid and SCHIP.49
Specifically, they wonder whether the criteria that DHHS will use to
operate programs under the HIFA waiver will satisfy Medicaid's purpose of
providing adequate coverage to vulnerable populations.0 They also wonder
how beneficiary interests will be represented in a waiver approval process
that promises the states a quick turnaround.5' Moreover, the HIFA waiver
does not require states to reinvest the savings from these actions to expand
health coverage to additional people.12 "A state could use part of all of the
savings to offset existing Medicaid and SCHIP obligations or to finance
other budget items, such as constructing roads or providing tax cuts."53 To
address some of these concerns, some consumer advocates suggest
relieving states from making the choice between cutting back on Medicaid
and expanding coverage, and instead encourage the federal government to
provide states with additional financial resources and incentives.54
The concerns expressed in the GAO Report and by consumer advocates
are legitimate and should be taken very seriously. However, if states were
to apply a collaborative governance model to HIFA waiver proposal
development and implementation, they could reconcile many of the issues
raised by these groups. Collaborative governance structures that involve all
local health care stakeholders and include support by state agencies could
design programs that expand health coverage through learning and
consensus. This process might require more time and resources up front,
but the final product could be more satisfactory to all involved.
47. Id. at 7.
48. Id. at 9-10.
49. MANN, supra note 2, at 25-26; NHELP Brochure, supra note 45.
50. MANN, supra note 2, at 26.
51. Id.
52. PARK & Ku, supra note 9, at 3.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 11.
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III. THE COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE MODEL
Collaborative governance is one way to improve the quality, ability to
implement, and legitimacy of government agency initiatives, such as
rulemaking or program development.5 Collaborative governance recasts
outside stakeholders as potential contributors and equal partners to the
rulemaking or program creation process, rather than a threat to agency
ideas.56 Specifically, collaborative governance has the following features:
(a) a problem-solving orientation, requiring information sharing and
deliberation among knowledgeable parties;
(b) participation by interested and affected parties in all stages of the
decision-making process, which may also facilitate effective problem
solving;
(c) development of temporary rules subject to revision, contingent upon
the findings of continuous monitoring and evaluation;
(d) replacement or supplementation of traditional oversight mechanisms
with new allocations of authority because parties are interdependent
and accountable to each other; and
(e) the agency acting as a facilitator of multi-stakeholder negotiations
and viewing regulatory success as contingent on the contributions of
other participants.
These conditions result in mutual learning among stakeholders, produce
more innovative solutions that can adapt to changing conditions and
encourage greater stakeholder adoption and compliance. Negotiated
rulemaking and environmental permitting projects offer some examples that
57
encompass many of the ideas behind collaborative governance.
55. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 22 (1997).
56. Id.
57. Briefly, "negotiated rule making is a consensus-based process, usually convened by
an agency, through which stakeholders negotiate the substance of a rule." Id. at 34. The idea
of negotiated rulemaking or "regulatory negotiation" ("reg-neg"), grew in the early 1980's
as a way to decrease the amount of time to develop regulations, improve the substance and
acceptability of rules, and reduce the number of judicial challenges to the rules. Matthew J.
McKinney, Negotiated Rulemaking: Involving Citizens in Public Decisions, 60 MONT. L.
REV. 499, 501 (1999). Congress institutionalized the idea of negotiated rulemaking with the
adoption of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act (NRA) in 1990. Freeman, supra note 55, at 36.
The Act sets statutory guidelines for using reg-neg, such as announcing the formation of a
negotiating committee in the Federal Register, but also "allows for great flexibility and
encourages experimentation and innovation by federal agencies." McKinney, supra, at 503;
Freeman, supra note 55, at 37. The Act also emphasizes public participation and
communication between stakeholders. McKinney, supra, at 503. For a more discussion of
negotiated rulemaking, please refer to Freeman, supra note 55, at 36-40; McKinney, supra,
at 505-08 (describing the Montana Negotiated Rulemaking Act). In an environmental permit
process, the EPA may approve a single permit to control total emissions rather than a
separate permit for each type of emission (e.g., air and water emissions). Freeman, supra
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Collaborative governance can be contrasted with other administrative
processes such as interest representation and civic republicanism. Both
interest representation and civic republicanism often neglect adequate
public participation.58 Interest representation is characterized by: (a)
constrained agency discretion through competition among interest groups in
rule-making; (b) rule construction based on bargains and trade-offs made
between the agency and stakeholders; (c) viewing agency officials as
insiders and other stakeholders as outsiders; (d) adversarial relationships,
with stakeholders seeking to maximize their interests by winning on
important issues; and (e) the agency acting as a neutral and reactive arbiter
among stakeholders, seeking compromise in response to pressure from
outsiders.59
In civic republicanism, government agency decisions are made by
relying on expert administrator deliberation, rather than competition among
interest groups.60 Civic republicans believe that public policy should be
"made by enlightened, empowered bureaucrats acting in the 'public
interest,' an interest that can be subverted by private bargaining in the
interest representation regime." 61  Civic republicans view public
participation as obstructing reasoned deliberation of expert administrators
who should be policed by executive, congressional and judicial oversight.62
Thus, both interest representation and civic republicanism juxtapose the
government agency with outside stakeholders when making, implementing,
and enforcing rules.
The traditional notice and comment process in rulemaking illustrates the
limits of interest representation and civic republicanism. Under the notice
and comment process, the agency acts as an expert administrator when
initially developing the proposed rule.63 "Only after the Notice of Proposed
Rule Making ("NPRM") do parties supply detailed arguments about the
technical and practical difficulties of implementing a rule, instead of much
earlier when the information might be more valuable to the agency in
formulating the proposed rule. '' 6 Thus, the government agency may not
have all the necessary information to formulate a practical rule that outside
note 55, at 55. This allows companies to exchange a decrease in one type of pollutant for an
increase in another type, so long as the company promises "superior environmental
performance" overall. Id.
58. Freeman, supra note 55, at 18-22.
59. Id. at 18-19.
60. Id. at 20.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 13.
64. Id. at 12.
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stakeholders can, and want to, implement. 65  Furthermore, traditional
rulemaking with notice and comment processes often ignores finding
solutions to the regulatory problem at hand. Instead it forces stakeholders
to take extreme positions on the rule with the anticipation that the agency
will "split the difference" between competing positions. 6 Hence, "parties
miss opportunities to engage constructively with each other in a sustained
way,, 67 because the government agency typically consults with each
68stakeholder one at a time.
Due to its emphasis on problem-solving, collaborative governance could
help negotiating parties shift their focus from a narrow issue to the root of
the problem, thereby fostering learning and compromise. According to one
researcher, learning takes place "when parties redefine their projects and
obligations as their joint experience outpaces their initial understanding., 69
Collaborative governance cultivates such learning among opposing
stakeholders. "When actors jointly explore problems they modify their
perceptions of problems and interests. The outcome is thought to be a
positive sum where - compared to following one's own strategic interest -
collaborative interactions or discussions which lead to jointly defined
interests can provide mutual gain to parties without them feeling like they
have given up some important part of their self-interest., 70  Thus,
collaborations could improve the amount and quality of the information
shared between stakeholders.71
The problem-solving nature of collaborative governance also mandates
face-to-face negotiations between stakeholders, which helps stakeholders
resist being extreme or unrealistic.7 ' The collaborative scheme forces
parties to make hard compromises on issues which government agencies
otherwise would have to resolve alone.73 Creative solutions, capable of
implementation, often result from these negotiations and compromises.
Although the solutions achieved through a collaborative process may not be
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 11.
68. McKinney, supra note 57, at 500.
69. Christine Overdevest, OMCs and Learning Literature 4 (Oct. 23, 2001) (quoting
Charles Sable) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
70. Id. at 10.
71. Freeman, supra note 55, at 54; McKinney, supra note 57, at 536 (noting that two
state-level reg-neg cases demonstrate "the critical importance of joint fact-finding and
mutual education").
72. Freeman, supra note 55, at 54.
73. Id.
74. Freeman argues that the compromised solution is likely to be more implemented and
sustained because the various stakeholders helped create it. Id. at 27, 54.
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ideal for a particular interest, participants may perceive the process of
collaboration as more fair and just, and therefore, more successful than
traditional interest representation or civic republican models. According to
Thibaut and Walker, "people seek to maximize their personal involvement
in decisional processes and gauge the fairness of processes by the degree of
that participation."
75
Despite the benefits of collaborative governance schemes, such schemes
face criticism and may not be applicable in every situation. Concerns about
collaborative governance can be lumped into three categories: (a) fear of
collusion; (b) questions about public accountability; and (c) resource
intensity. One of the primary concerns with collaborative processes is
collusion.7 ' Advocates fear that collaboration may exacerbate the
weaknesses of interest representation by providing an opportunity for the
agency and industry to propose solutions that undermine the public
interest. 77 "Too much cooperation between government and regulated
parties could lead to unhealthy relationships in which both regulated parties
and government officials gain at the expense of the public interest. ' 7 ' This
fear is fueled by the fact that most community groups do not have the
knowledge-base or financial resources to participate in collaborative
groups, thereby making negotiations unbalanced.7 9
A related concern is the lack of public accountability in collaborative
solutions, particularly due to sub-delegation and unfettered agency
discretion.'o Accountability is a basic tenet in administrative law.
However, the fundamental problem of administrative law is "trying to
design a system of checks that will minimize the risks of bureaucratic
arbitrariness and overreaching, while preserving for the agencies the
flexibility they need to act effectively."'" One can measure accountability
using three factors: the degree to which the public can influence a decision
75. Mark R. Fondacaro, Toward a Synthesis of Law and Social Science: Due Process
and Procedural Justice in the Context of National Health Care Reform, 72 DENV. U. L.
REv. 303, n.92 (1995).
76. Freeman, supra note 55, at 83.
77. Id. at 56, 83.
78. Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1507, 1537 (2001).
79. Freeman, supra note 55, at 56, 83.
80. Id. at 83-87.
81. WEST LEGAL DIRECTORY, ADMIN. LAW AND PROCEDURE, http://www.wld.com/
conbus/weal/wadminl.htm. See also A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 542 (1935) (finding unconstitutional a law giving the President of the United
States, rather than Congress, powers to make codes for the rehabilitation and expansion of
trade or industry); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (finding that
delegating the power to fix maximum hours of labor to coal producers rather than the
government violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment).
2003]
15
Zabawa: Making the Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA)
Published by LAW eCommons, 2003
Annals of Health Law
through political activity; the degree to which the public can discern who is
responsible for a decision; and the degree to which information regarding
activities is available.82 Interest representation and civic republicanism rely
on judicial review as a means to ensure agency legitimacy. 3 In comparison,
collaborative governance schemes that rely on agency compliance with
performance-based standards, such as the goal of expanding health
coverage, make detection of regulatory violations more difficult.84
Potentially, stakeholder self-monitoring creates difficulties in accessing
information. The sub-delegation of monitoring activities to a private
organization blurs the determination of who is responsible for program
decisions while also reducing the ability of agencies to compare data and
determine whether progress is being made. For example, Massachusetts
has delegated much of the mental health administration within its Medicaid
program to a private entity. This delegation has created a gap in
information, making it difficult for meaningful oversight of the mental
health program because "data across contractors are not comparable, and
the amount of information available from the current managed care
company, and from the Division of Medical Assistance, is far too limited to
allow healthy public debate about the wisdom of the program.'"5
A third concern regarding collaborative governance is the amount of
resources that are necessary for its proper implementation. One researcher
notes that collaborative governance can be very resource-intensive for all
involved in the process.86  For example, the collaborative process of
negotiated rulemaking "requires the participants to review additional
documents and generate ideas, proposals, and perhaps data - all of which
takes time. ' ' 87 Furthermore, the time it often takes to reach consensus can
drain an agency and other stakeholders' resources and morale. Even for
industry representatives, "the pressure to show short-term profit
discourages executives from making large investments of company time
and resources in uncertain [consensus-based] processes that cannot
82. Beermann, supra note 78, at 1509.
83. Freeman, supra note 55, at 82.
84. Beermann, supra note 78, at 1535. There are measurability, time lag and attribution
problems with relying on performance-based standards such as "expanding health care
coverage." But these problems are not insurmountable. For an interesting discussion of this
issue, see MARK SCHACTER, INST. ON GOVERNANCE, WHAT WILL BE, WILL BE: THE
CHALLENGE OF APPLYING RESULTS-BASED THINKING TO POLICY 10 (2002),
http://www.iog.ca/publications/resultsandpolicy.pdf.
85. Manjusha P. Kulkami et al., Public Health and Private Profit: A Witch's Brew,
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 629, 641-42 (Jan.-Feb. 2002).
86. McKinney, supra note 57, at 500-01.
87. Id.
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guarantee results. 8 8 One government official commented that state
agencies are not very excited about having open meetings in which, like
collaborations, debate of a proposal can be quite lengthy.89
One response to the critiques of collaborative governance is to allow the
government to continue to play a critical role in collaborations. For
instance, agencies could retain the authority to withdraw from the
negotiated agreements, and improprieties in the decision-making process
could be challenged through petitions for judicial review, at least with
regard to agency rulemaking.90 Certain collaborative governance schemes,
like negotiated rulemaking, are subject to open meetings law and
negotiations must be made public record. 9' One researcher has noted that
with respect to sub-delegation, accountability may not be an impediment to
privatization as long as the private company is given detailed,
comprehensive instructions by a governmental agency, and that agency
remains accountable for the successes and failures of that private entity.92
Hence, as long as the government agency maintains a significant role in the
collaborative regime and checks and balances exist within the system, fears
about collusion and accountability should be diminished.
However, traditional forms of accountability should not be the central
focus of successful collaborative endeavors. 93 Instead, the public must
change the way it views accountability. Under a collaborative governance
model, agencies require flexibility and should withdraw from negotiated
agreements sparingly. If the agency is too proscriptive or threatening in
relation to the other stakeholders, participants will never engage in
prolonged negotiation to achieve consensus or have a sense of ownership of
the agreement. 94 Consequently, one should establish alternative forms of
accountability that foster flexibility in program development and
implementation. In a collaborative governance environment, Congress
could authorize legislation approving agency departure from statutory limits
if stakeholders agreed to certain conditions, which would rein in agency
abuse of discretion." These conditions could include items such as apromise of superior performance, that there be no risk of adverse effects, or
88. Freeman, supra note 55, at 76.
89. Telephone Interview with Jim Edge, State Contact for the Oregon HIFA Waiver
Proposal (Aug. 6, 2002).
90. Freeman, supra note 55, at 87-89. See discussion infra note 179 and accompanying
text.
91. Freeman, supra note 55, at 89.
92. Beermann, supra note 78, at 1517.
93. See Freeman, supra note 55, at 95-96.
94. Id. at 92; McKinney, supra note 57, at 536.
95. Freeman, supra note 55, at 90.
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that there be reliable monitoring mechanisms.96 The key to legislation that
is conducive to collaboration is to not "preordain solutions," but rather to
leave open the methods of achieving the statute's goal. 97  Under this
scheme, collaborations could act as information-gathering entities and act
as a critical resource for legislators when deciding future legislation. 9'
As for the resource intensity that collaborative governance models
require, proponents point toward the long-term benefits and potential
savings that such models create.99 For example, in a Montana collaborative
governance initiative, participants met for over twenty months negotiating
rules around game farms, and another four months seeking ratification from
each of the stakeholders' constituency.' °° As a result, there was essentially
no opposition to the proposed rules.' ° ' Thus, if the ultimate goal in creating
rules or programs is to see implementation of those rules or programs, then
the amount or resources spent on achieving that goal should become less
relevant. In essence, the goal for stakeholders in a collaborative governance
model becomes the development of a high quality rule or program.102
"Even if producing such [collaborative] solutions requires a more up-front
investment of resources than informal rule making, the resulting rules may
ultimately reduce the cost of legal challenge and resistance to
implementation."' 03
Despite all the rhetoric about collaborative governance, it may not apply
in every circumstance. In fact, since the early 1980's, less than one percent
of all administrative rules promulgated by the federal government have
used negotiated rulemaking.' ° One researcher has noted that the existence
of a controversial, complex issue that is of high priority to identifiable
stakeholders creates an ideal condition for the application of collaborative
governance.0 5 The HIFA waiver, particularly with its features of agency
flexibility and public-private partnership around the complex issue of health
system reform, presents such a condition. States could apply a
collaborative governance model under the HIFA waiver by facilitating
stakeholder design and implementation of a health coverage expansion
program. Such collaboration would consist of consumer groups, providers,
96. Id.
97. Id. at 95.
98. Id. at 93.
99. See, e.g., McKinney, supra note 57, at 501.
100. Id. at 515.
101. Id.
102. Freeman, supra note 55, at 26-27.
103. Id. at 26.
104. McKinney, supra note 57, at 503.
105. Id. at 530.
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insurers, businesses, and government seeking to solve the problem of a
complete lack of insurance and underinsurance by designing, implementing,
and monitoring a consensus-based solution. The solution, however, would
be subject to revision, depending on changes in the market or regulatory
environment. Members of the collaboration would be accountable to each
other, ensuring that the devised solution met its goals of health coverage
expansion. Finally, the state agency would act as the facilitator of the
collaboration, "providing technical resources, funding, and organizational
support when needed."' 6 Applying collaborative governance to HIFA
waiver program development may actually achieve HIFA's goal of
expanding health care coverage.
IV. APPLYING THE COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE MODEL
TO HIFA WAIVER INITIATIVES
The HIFA waiver's emphasis on flexibility and public-private
partnerships should encourage states to incorporate collaborative
governance models when developing HIFA waiver proposals. Specifically,
the HIFA waiver is flexible with respect to state program design and
requires each state to "develop coordinated private and public health
insurance coverage options to low income uninsured." 107 The general goal
of the HIFA waiver - to expand health insurance coverage - helps maintain
agency accountability and provides a framework in which the collaboration
can work, but also allows states to experiment with methods to achieve that
goal.' °s Researchers have suggested that greater flexibility in the Medicaid
program may help states cover more uninsured low-income workers.' 9 The
HIFA waiver's flexibility to adjust benefit and cost-sharing levels to meet
local interest and needs, and public-private coordination requirements,
could nurture collaborative approaches to program design and
implementation. Because parties have more freedom to find a consensus-
based solution, the collaborative approach is ideal.
State adoption of collaborative approaches in developing HIFA waiver
106. Freeman, supra note 55, at 22.
107. HCFA HIFA Article, supra note 3, at 1.
108. Id. Of course, there are federal resource constraints with implementing HIFA
waiver programs. See supra text accompanying notes 4, 25. It should be noted at the outset
that some may question the federal government's role entirely in health coverage expansion,
since health care reform has devolved to the state level. See, e.g., Louise G. Trubek, Public
Interest Lawyers and New Governance: Advocating for Healthcare, 2002 Wis. L. REV., 575,
594. However, the Medicaid program is a federal-state initiative, and federal dollars
significantly support the program. See CARABELL & MEGNA, supra note 18, at 1. Plus,
federal involvement can facilitate data collection and learning among states.
109. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Medicaid Coverage for the Working Uninsured: The
Role of State Policy, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 241.
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proposals is important for three primary reasons. First, public-private
collaboration at local levels is an essential element in the controversial and
complex endeavor of health system reform. Second, collaborative models
could overcome barriers to successful program implementation. In
particular, collaboration could increase stakeholder buy-in, provide notice
to stakeholders about the proposed health reform ideas, and help states gain
access to private health coverage information. Third, collaborative
governance in HIFA waiver proposals could maximize the benefits
experienced by current community collaborations. These benefits include:
access to greater and more stable funding sources, access to a facilitator that
can collect and distribute data, and an avenue for accountability. Each of
these reasons will be discussed, using examples of collaborative efforts
from Wisconsin, San Diego, Michigan, Illinois, and Oregon to illustrate the
successes and failures of attempted stakeholder coordination.
A. Health System Reform Demands Collaboration Between Local,
Public-Private Entities
The HIFA waiver's emphasis on agency flexibility and public-private
coordination may be a response to what is already happening or should
happen in health system reform. Namely, expanding health care coverage
is too complex an endeavor for one stakeholder to achieve alone and
therefore coalitions emerge. The few programs that have been proposed
thus far under HIFA demonstrate the complexity and controversy behind
the issue of expanding coverage to the uninsured and underinsured."'
States that have proposed to reduce benefits or raise consumer cost-sharing
levels saw protests by provider and consumer groups."' States that
explored premium assistance programs drew the attention of insurers and
employer groups. ' 2  Thus, health system reform efforts affect many
powerful interest groups, such as insurers, employers, consumer groups,
and providers.' 13
110. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 28 (noting that advocates and providers
in Utah "expressed concern about reduced optional benefits and increased cost sharing for
current beneficiaries, the planned enrollment fee and co-payments, and lack of specialty
services and inpatient hospital coverage for the waiver expansion population"); KAISER
DAILY HEALTH POL'Y REPORT, States Should Not Use Unspent CHIP Money to Cover
Uninsured Adults, USA Today Editorial States (Aug. 15, 2002),
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily-reports.
111. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 28.
112. ARIZ. HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT SYSTEM, FEASIBILITY STUDY OF AN
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED INSURANCE PILOT PROGRAM IN ARIZONA 7 (2002) (on file with
author).
113. WIS. DEP'T OF HEALTH & FAMILY SERV., BADGERCARE PROPOSAL 50, 51 (Dec. 22,
1998) (noting the various interested parties with whom DHFS met to discuss the BadgerCare
[Vol. 12
20
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 12 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 11
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol12/iss2/11
Making the HIFA Waiver Work
All of these stakeholders agree that the complex issue of the uninsured
must be resolved."4 And in response to this unified interest, stakeholder
coalitions, at both the state and national levels, developed.' Broad
participation in such coalitions is only likely to increase as the economy
weakens. For example, employers who may not concern themselves with
the rates of insurance outside their own organization, have recently
expressed concern about the rates of those without insurance. These
employers noted that "paying for the uninsured is making health care even
more expensive for private employers and government programs.""116 It is
during difficult economic times that employers are more likely to express
interest in and participate in health reform efforts." '7
Many current health reform coalitions may have formed because state
Medicaid agencies have recognized the importance of collaboration in
addressing the issue of the uninsured. For example, Wisconsin, one of the
eleven states that won "State Planning Grant" funding from DHHS to study
the uninsured, stated in its final State Planning Grant report"' that building
community partnerships is an effective strategy in collecting data to study
the uninsured problem. This allows the State "to obtain valuable
proposal, including physicians, businesses, consumer advocates, and managed care
organizations) (on file with author).
114. Milt Freudenheim, Next Big Health Debate: How to Help Uninsured, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 2002, at C I (stating that employers, labor unions, Congressional leaders, consumers
and insurers all believe resolving the uninsured issue is important), http://www.nytimes.com/
2002/08/27/business/27CARE.html.
115. Id. (discussing the National Coalition on Health Care (NCHC)). NCHC members
include corporations, labor unions, small business, and the nation's major religious,
consumer and health care provider organizations. NAT'L COALITION ON HEALTH CARE, WHO
WE ARE, http://www.nchc.org/principles.html. NCHC members hope to achieve universal
coverage. Id. See also UTAH DEP'T OF HEALTH, COVERING KIDS, Covering Kids State
Projects Utah, at http://www.coveringkids.org/projects/state.php3?StatefD=UT (noting how
Utah plans to increase health insurance to children by increasing coordination between
public and private entities statewide); City of Milwaukee, BadgerCare Coordinated Network
Mission Statement (Oct. 1, 2001) (on file with author) (stating that the Network's goal is to
provide easy access to publicly funded resources through collaboration and coordination
with community organizations and local and state government agencies) [hereinafter
BadgerCare Coordinated Network Mission Statement]; SHARON SILOW-CARROLL ET AL., THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND, EXPANDING EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH COVERAGE: LESSONS
FROM SIX STATE AND LocAL PROGRAMS 41 (2001) (describing a collaboration in Muskegon
County, Michigan that consisted of patient, provider and community representation to
expand employment-based coverage); see www.cmwf.org.
116. Freudenheim,supra note 114.
117. Peter Swensen & Scott Greer, Foul Weather Friends: Big Business and Health
Care Reform in the 1990's in Historical Perspective, 27 J. OF HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 605,
615 (2002).
118. Dennis Chaptman, State Wins Funds to Find Out Who Lacks Health Insurance,
Why, MILW. J. SENTINEL, Sept. 22, 2000, http://www.jsonline.com/news/state/sep00/
insure23092200.asp.
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information and gain perspective on issues of the uninsured from a
community or local viewpoint."" 9 The State acknowledged that "particular
groups of uninsured face barriers to health insurance coverage for a variety
of reasons that, perhaps, could be most effectively addressed at the local
level or through pooling of resources and State-local partnerships." In
addition, the State of Utah, which also received a State Planning Grant,
revealed that its planning process to address the uninsured involved
"widespread representation from all sectors of Utah that have an interest in
the uninsured issue," including private citizens, providers, agencies,
advocacy groups, business, and academia.'20 Thus, it appears that at least
some states recognize that the problem of the uninsured cannot be resolved
without additional stakeholder support.
State recognition of the need for public-private collaboration might
reflect a shift in responsibility for health care reform from the federal level
to local levels (the movement down) and from government to private
entities (the movement out). The movement down from federal to state
level governance has been occurring for the past few decades, with welfare
reform being the "hallmark of this process of devolution."' 2' The
movement down has also affected health care reform efforts, although
researchers disagree as to the extent of or reasons behind relinquishment of
federal power.'22 There is agreement, however, that states play a significant
119. Wis. DEP'T OF HEALTH & FAMILY SERVS., WIS. STATE PLANNING GRANT FINAL
REPORT TO THE SEC'Y 59 (2001), http://www.dhfs.state.wi.us/medicaidl/state-grant/
SPG-final.pdf.
120. UTAH DEP'T OF HEALTH, Div. OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING, 1115 DEMONSTRATION
WAIVER REQUEST FOR THE PRIMARY CARE NETWORK OF UTAH 16 (2002) (on file with
author).
121. Trubek, supra note 108, at 580-81 (indicating that "[r]ather than a mere anomaly,
welfare reform is regarded as the 'maturation of a generation-long trend that fundamentally
transformed community governance"'). Welfare reform denotes the switch from Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which relied on federal subsidies and a
centralized administrative system, to a state-based block grant system under the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, the aim of
which is to move people off welfare and into jobs. Id.; Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 401, 110 Stat. 2105, 2114
(1996). Professor Trubek attributes the move from federal to state control to the distrust in
federal agencies that occurred as a result of social unrest and political pressures brought
about by inflation in the 1970s. Trubek, supra note 108, at 580.
122. Trubek, supra note 108, at 581 (stating that some early critics of the 1996 welfare
reform have been won over); John D. Blum, Leveraging Quality in Managed Care: Moving
Advocates Back into the Box, 2002 Wis. L. REV., 617-19 (noting that the "recent shifts in
authority downward do not reflect a belief in state governments' abilities, but rather reflect
an ongoing belief on the part of federal law-makers that the national government needs to be
released of some of its obligations" and that "it seems reasonable to argue that government
power in health care, while somewhat diffused, has resided, and continues to reside, at the
national level.").
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role in health policy and serve as interesting laboratories for health reform
efforts. 23 For example, states traditionally have played an integral part in
health care policy and delivery, due in part to their role as guarantor of
health and welfare under the Tenth Amendment. 124 Health insurance and
medical malpractice issues have traditionally been a state level concern, and
recent Supreme Court cases support that notion.' 25 But welfare reform,
coupled with the federal government's inability to expand health coverage,
has bolstered the role of the state in health care reform efforts. 26 SCRIP
was tied to welfare reform by enabling state development of programs that
would encourage low-income mothers to move off welfare and into jobs
without fear of losing health coverage. 27 Since the passage of SCHIP, all
states, commonwealths, and territories have implemented health coverage
programs under SCRIP in an effort to expand coverage and reform health
128
care.
States have reformed the health system by involving private
stakeholders, which illustrates the movement out. "The movement out is a
series of systems that link public and private organizations and is related to
what is often called 'privatization' - an increased reliance on the private
institutions of society to satisfy public needs." 2 9 For example, Wisconsin
formed its original BadgerCare proposal as a result of a coalition of
religious groups, direct service providers, and nonprofit organizations that
gathered to analyze the State's welfare reform proposal. 30 Another
Wisconsin collaboration of providers and consumers, the Collaboration for
123. Blum, supra note 122, at 620; Louise G. Trubek, Symposium: Barriers to Access to
Health Care, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 157, 166 (2002).
124. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
125. See, e.g., FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 515 (4'
ed. 2001); Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 236-37 (2000) (noting that "in the field of
health care, a subject of traditional state regulation, there is no ERISA preemption without
clear manifestation of congressional purpose" and stating that it is not the federal role or
intent under ERISA to apply a malpractice standard to HMOs); Rush v. Moran, 536 U.S.
355, 372-379 (2002) (stating that a state's external review law is saved from ERISA
preemption under ERISA § 514(b) because it regulates insurance, using the McCarran-
Ferguson Act factors as a guidepost, and does not provide an alternative remedy to that
available under ERISA § 502(a)).
126. Trubek, supra note 123, at 158 (stating that "[t]he public policy vacuum created by
the failure of the Clinton plan is being filled by state-based initiatives that provide coverage
and access for low-income people.").
127. See, e.g., Louise G. Trubek, The Health Care Puzzle, in HARD LABOR: WOMEN AND
WORK IN THE POST-WELFARE ERA 147 (Joel F. Handler & Lucie White eds. 1999).
128. GABRIELA ALCALDE, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, EXPLORING A
NEW OPTION: SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATION WAIVERS UNDER THE STATE CHILDREN'S
HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM 3-7 (2001).
129. Trubek, supra note 123, at 167.
130. Id. at 148.
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Healthcare Consumer Protection ("CHCP"), helped shape patients' rights
legislation in the state."' New Mexico designed an employer-based
solution to expand health coverage through a collaboration of health care
groups, state and local government, business organizations, and advocacy
organizations. Finally, groups like the Kaiser Family Foundation and the
Urban Institute make data available about health reform efforts across
states, which helps states learn from one another and encourage further
experimentation. 131
Some researchers attribute the reliance on more private actors for public
program guidance as an indication that the current policy regime no longer
works.' Others state that collaborations among public and private actors
may "reflect a serious desire to carry out major change."' 35 Regardless of
the reason behind public-private coordination efforts, both state and federal
governments have come to rely on various health care stakeholders for
health program information and implementation. This reliance illustrates
the difficulty a single public entity has in developing health coverage
expansion programs in a civic republican or interest representation regime.
As a result, stakeholder coalitions become necessary to develop feasible and
acceptable programs. One could argue that the HIFA waiver allows these
coalitions to continue and grow by encouraging partnership between public
and private stakeholders, such as through premium assistance programs,
and offering flexible conditions in which these coalitions can develop
innovative solutions to expanding health coverage.
131. Id. at 591-92.
132. STATE OF NEW MEXICO, NEW MEXICO STATE COVERAGE INITIATIVE PLANNING
GRANT 5 (May 2001-Dec. 2001) [hereinafter NEW MEXICO GRANT REPORT] (on file with
author).
133. Trubek, supra note 123, at 171-74; Interview with Don Schneider, Chief of
Coordination of Benefits Section, DHFS, in Madison, Wis. (Aug. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Don
Schneider Aug. 16 Interview] (noting that groups like Kaiser Family Foundation ("KFF")
cropped up because they wanted to focus on research and provide data to entities to make
policy). As health coverage expansions occurred, both state and the federal governments
needed information and groups like KFF had the data. Don Schneider Aug. 16 Interview,
supra note 132. See also URBAN INSTITUTE, ASSESSING THE NEW FEDERALISM PROJECT
MISSION STATEMENT (2001), http://www.urban.org/Content/Research/NewFederalism/
AboutANF/AboutANF.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2002) (stating that the Assessing the New
Federalism project is a multi-year project to analyze the devolution of responsibility for
social programs from the federal government to the states, focusing primarily on health care
and welfare reform programs).
134. Charles Sabel, The Changing Shape of Government, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1319,
1351 (2001) (noting that in the public school system, "the way you on the outside know they
say that [the system is not working] is because all of a sudden you get coalitions, quite
surprising coalitions, of very disgruntled insiders whose professional honor, whose sense of
dedication, whose sense of humanity, and whose sense of disgust are triggered, teaming up
with people on the outside to try new things"); Trubek, supra note 108, at 586.
135. Trubek, supra note 108, at 586.
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B. Overcoming Barriers to Program Success
State collaboration with other health care system stakeholders in HIFA
waiver proposal development may overcome obstacles that often diminish
the success of health coverage expansion programs. These obstacles
include: stakeholder buy-in to program design and implementation, notice
to stakeholders, and access to private health coverage information.
1. Buy-in
There are several examples of how collaboration among stakeholders
increases buy-in and the impact of that buy-in on program success. One
example, the San Diego Financially Obtainable Coverage for Uninsured
San Diegans ("FOCUS") program, is a premium assistance program
targeted at lower-income employees in small businesses.1 3 6 FOCUS arose
out of a community-based forum that discussed health care access issues."'
The forum included representatives from provider organizations, local
government, and health insurers, among others.'38 "Since a group
comprising of hospitals, insurers, and other community members developed
FOCUS, local providers agreed to serve FOCUS enrollees at reduced rates
and brokers agreed to participate without commissions."' 3 9 The designers
of FOCUS declined to make the program publicly-based because wrapping
FOCUS services around Medicaid or SCHIP would have been too
administratively burdensome.' ° Thus, financing FOCUS with private
141resources allowed more flexibility in designing the program.
FOCUS recipients receive a "reasonably generous" benefit package with
minimal cost-sharing that includes: physician office visits for a $5 co-
payment; 100 percent hospitalization coverage; outpatient prescription
drugs ($5 generic/$15 brand name co-payments); urgent care services for a
$5 co-payment; emergency room services for a $50 co-payment; home
health services; and limited mental health and chemical dependency
coverage. 42 Employees share in the cost of the premium, which amounts to
$10 to $194 per month, depending on income and family size.43 FOCUS
136. SILOW-CARROLL ET AL., supra note 115, at 44. Small business is defined as fifty or
fewer employees and low-income is defined as incomes up to 300% of the Federal Poverty
Level. Id.
137. Id. at 43.
138. Id.
139. Id. at vii (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 44-45.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 44-45. In addition, there are no deductibles or lifetime maximums, and the
annual co-payments are capped at $1,500 per individual and $3,000 per family. Id.
143. Id.
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demonstrates that given flexibility in program design, collaborators will not
necessarily reduce benefits or increase recipient cost-sharing. Rather, the
program achieves cost-savings through stakeholder buy-in. Specifically,
providers have agreed to lower reimbursements, brokers do not charge
commissions for enrolling businesses in the program, and the plan
administrator donates one-third of its typical administrative costs) 4
Another example of collaboration creating a health coverage expansion
program buy-in is the Access Health program in Muskegon County,
Michigan. Access Health covers approximately 500 people and targets
working uninsured people who make $10 per hour or less .1' The program
was designed through a "community decision-making process" that
involved employers and providers.' 46 The HMO community was not
involved in the design process, so when program planners approached them
with the benefit package, HMOs declined to offer the package for the price
that employers were willing to pay.14 Thus, Access Health became an
independent nonprofit organization that contracts directly with providers.
8
Access Health is financed by employers, employees, and community
match (consisting of federal, local government, community, and foundation
funds).'4 9 This allows it to be flexible in its design and to respond to
changes in the health care marketplace. For example, after Access Health
was implemented, program officials learned that they could benefit more
employees if they extended eligibility to businesses with more than
nineteen employees.'5° "Such flexibility ensures that even if the target
population changes, programs will be able to adapt and continue to provide
health insurance to low-income workers.""' The Muskegon community
views the program as successful, and has attributed much of the program's
success to community involvement (including the medical community) in
developing the program. 5 Patients, providers, and other community
members continue their involvement in Access Health through a
community board.'53 "Program officials noted that because the program
ideas originated in the community, the creative structure of the program
144. Id.
145. Id. at 37.
146. Id. at 36.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 38.
150. Id. at 40.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 40-41.
153. Id. at 41.
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was acceptable to the community.'"
In Illinois, the Illinois KidCare Rebate program provides another
example of how collaboration under flexible conditions can create
stakeholder buy-in. In designing its KidCare Rebate program in 1998,
Illinois used a taskforce consisting of legislators, governor's office staff,
providers, insurers, local government officials, and advocates in order to
determine eligibility criteria, benefit design, and cost-sharing structures. '55
The taskforce also worked with employer groups. 5 6 Initially, the program,
a type of premium assistance program, was funded completely by the state
without federal matching funds (covering children from low-income
families).'57 As a result, the state had flexibility with regard to benefit and
cost-sharing levels,'58 similar to the flexibility now provided under the
HIFA waiver. According to one state official, the taskforce reached a
compromise that allowed for lower benefit levels (i.e., physician visits and
hospital inpatient services) but minimized beneficiary cost-sharing.5 9 To
date, there have been no complaints from stakeholders about the program
and the program covers 5,779 children.' 6° The State is expanding the
KidCare Rebate program to cover optional categories of parents and
children through a HIFA waiver. Interestingly, even the GAO found that
Illinois interest groups did not complain about public notice issues during
the Illinois HIFA waiver application process.161
The success of the Illinois KidCare Rebate program is contrasted with
the low enrollment numbers of Wisconsin's premium assistance program.
Wisconsin's Medicaid expansion program, BadgerCare, has a premium
assistance component labeled the Health Insurance Premium Purchase
("HIPP") program.16  This program was developed under a section 1115
154. Id.
155. Telephone Interview with Jane Longo, Chief of KidCare Bureau, Illinois Dep't of
Public Aid (Sept. 11, 2002).
156. Id.
157. Id.; STATE OF ILL., ILLINOIS HIFA WAIVER APPLICATION 24, attach. D (2002),
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/hifa/hifapend.asp [hereinafter Illinois HIFA Application].
158. Interview with Jane Longo, supra note 155.
159. Id.
160. Id.; Illinois HIFA Application, supra note 157, at 24, Attach. D.
161. Press Release, Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., HHS Approves Illinois Plan to
Expand Health Insurance Coverage to Reach as Many as 300,000 Uninsured Residents
(Sept. 12, 2002), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2002pres/20020912a.htm. The state will
use unspent SCHIP dollars to expand the KidCare Rebate program to cover parents at higher
income levels. Id.
162. GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 27.
163. Wis. DEP'T OF HEALTH & FAMILY SERVS., BADGERCARE AT A GLANCE: PROGRAM
DESCRIPTION (May 2002) http://www.dhfs.state.wi.us/badgercare/html/glance_1 .htm
[hereinafter BadgerCare Brochure].
2003]
27
Zabawa: Making the Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA)
Published by LAW eCommons, 2003
Annals of Health Law
waiver prior to HIFA,' 6' so it contains a cost-effectiveness test and provides
wrap-around services equal to BadgerCare coverage. 65 As of May 2002,
only seventy-six families participated in the HIPP program' 66 (although this
was an increase from thirty-four families in February 2001).167 Wisconsin's
Department of Health and Family Services has noted that it is difficult to
meet the cost-effectiveness test in the HIPP program due to the costs of
providing wrap-around coverage and extra administrative costs involved in
following up with employers about their health plans.' 68  In addition,
enrollment in HIPP programs remains low "primarily because many
employer health plans do not meet SCHIP's benefit requirements and
because employers must contribute a substantial portion of the premium to
qualify." 169
As evidenced by the success of FOCUS, Access Health, and Illinois'
KidCare Rebate program, it could be argued that flexibility in benefit
design and cost-sharing structures, such as that available in the HIFA
waiver, increases stakeholder buy-in of the health coverage expansion
program. For example, both FOCUS and Access Health were funded
mostly with private dollars, removing many of the program design
restrictions that often accompany public funding. "When states develop
initiatives that operate under federal programs such as Medicaid or
[SCHIP], they gain continuing access to federal matching funds that finance
half or more of the costs, but must comply with numerous federal
regulations and reporting requirements." "7
The downside to rejecting federal funding sources is the limitation of
funds (and therefore limited program scale) in addition to increasing
vulnerability to financial and political crises.' 7' Yet removal of some of the
benefit coverage and employer premium contribution standards has
increased the number of people eligible for premium assistance programs,
164. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Div. OF STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH
INS., STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM ("SCHIP") APPROVED AND UNDER
REVIEW DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS TABLE (January 6, 2003) http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
schip/1 1 l5waiv.pdf.
165. BadgerCare Brochure, supra note 163.
166. Id.
167. Interview with Don Schneider, supra note 16.
168. Id. (indicating that cost-effectiveness is measured by comparing the cost of a
BadgerCare participant enrolled in a HMO with the cost of wrap-around coverage and extra
administrative costs provided in the HIPP program).
169. John Holahan et al., Health Policy for Low-Income People: States' Responses to
New Challenges, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Web Exclusive), W187, W199 (May 22, 2002), at
http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/2104Holahan2.pdf.
170. SILOW-CARROLL ETAL., supra note 115, at vii.
171. Id.
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thereby decreasing administrative costs in such programs."12 In addition,
flexibility in benefit design and cost-sharing strategies addresses some of
the employer concerns surrounding premium assistance programs. For
example, employers in New Jersey expressed apprehension of the state's
premium assistance programs because of employers' inability to meet
federal requirements related to cost-sharing and benefit packages.'73
Equally important, however, is that the FOCUS, Access Health, and
KidCare Rebate programs demonstrate that collaboration among
stakeholders in program development contributes to stakeholder buy-in.
Each of these three programs used a collaboration of stakeholders to
develop the health coverage expansion program, and all three programs
noted few complaints from stakeholders but rather quite substantial
cooperation in making the program succeed. The FOCUS program relies
on provider acceptance of reduced reimbursement and the absence of broker
commissions. Program officials have attributed this local support to
174stakeholder involvement in developing the program .
It is interesting to note the lack of HMO support in the Access Health
program. Program officials did not approach HMOs until after the program
was designed.'75 As a result, the program created a nonprofit to directly
contract with providers, bypassing the need for HMO involvement. 7 6
Finally, involving advocates in the design of KidCare Rebate minimized the
unrest among the advocacy community surrounding the program.
Advocates found it more acceptable to trade fewer benefits for more limited
177
cost-sharing because they helped design the program.
2. Notice to Stakeholders
DHHS requires each state to solicit public input in the development of
section 1115 waivers. "7 This public input may include: formal notice and
comment, public forums, legislative hearings, placement of information on
172. INST. FOR HEALTH POL'Y SOLUTIONS, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED IMPLEMENTING
REGULATIONS FOR THE STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM (HCFA-2006-P) 4
(2000), http://www.ihps.org/.
173. INST. FOR HEALTH POL'Y SOLUTIONS, COORDINATING STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH
INSURANCE PROGRAMS WITH EMPLOYER-BASED COVERAGE: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
PREMIUM ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 15 (1999), http://www.ihps.org/.
174. SILOW-CARROLL ET AL., supra note 115, at 7.
175. Id. at 36.
176. Id.
177. Interview with Jane Longo, supra note 155.
178. Letter from Dennis Smith, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Ctr. for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., to State Medicaid Directors, SMDL #02-007 (May 3, 2002) at
http://cms.hhs.gov/states/letters/smd50302.asp (last visited July 10, 2002) [hereinafter
DHHS Public Notice Letter].
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the state website with a link for public comments, distribution of draft
waiver applications for comment, public presentations, newspaper notices,
or a special commission with broad representation. Other than a special
commission (which fits most closely within the collaborative governance
model), each of the suggested ways to involve public participation fosters
interest representation rather than collaboration when designing proposed
program standards.'80 As noted earlier, traditional public input mechanisms,
such as notice and comment, may expose government agencies to interest
representation and adversarialism when unveiling a proposed health
coverage program under section 1115 waivers. Consequently, to satisfy the
HIFA waiver's public input requirement, but also to achieve a higher
quality and more legitimate solution, states could take advantage of HIFA's
emphasis on public-private partnership and apply a collaborative
governance model when designing HIFA waiver programs. Also, using
collaborative governance to achieve public notice may address the GAO's
criticism that some states lack adequate public notice in their HIFA waiver
proposals.'8' The GAO has noted that the methods that states can use to
satisfy public notice in waiver proposal development "do not necessarily
guarantee consensus on a state's planned waiver."'2
One method states could use to solicit public input in developing a
179. Id.
180. One difference between public input during administrative rulemaking processes
and program design under a section 1115 waiver is that the former is subject to judicial
review for noncompliance under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), whereas the latter
is arguably not subject to such review. For example, rulemaking is performed in the shadow
of the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires an agency to notify the public when
promulgating rules. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) & (c) (2002). The Act gives persons suffering "legal
wrongs because of agency action" the right to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2002).
"Agency action" includes the "whole or a part of an agency rule." 5 U.S.C. § 551(13)
(2002). However, at least at the federal level, designing programs or standards for section
1115 waivers are arguably not subject to judicial review under the APA because such action
is discretionary. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2002) (stating that the judicial review chapter of the APA
does not apply to agency action that is committed to agency discretion by law). Under 42
U.S.C. § 1315 (discussing section 1115 waivers or "demonstration projects"), the Secretary
"may waive compliance" with certain provisions of the SSA. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2002)
(emphasis added). It should be noted, however, that even with challenging a regulation due
to lack of public notice under rulemaking, a plaintiff may still have to show an actual injury.
See, e.g., Paul A. Garrahan, Note: Failing to See the Forest for the Trees: Standing to
Challenge National Forest Management Plans, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 168 (1996) (citing
the Supreme Court who noted, "a regulation is not ordinarily considered 'ripe' for judicial
review under the APA until the scope of the controversy has been reduced to more
manageable proportions, and its factual components fleshed out, by some concrete action
applying the regulation to the claimant's situation in a fashion that harms or threatens to
harm him" in Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990)).
181. GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 27.
182. Id.
[Vol. 12
30
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 12 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 11
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol12/iss2/11
Making the HIFA Waiver Work
waiver proposal is to "form[] a special commission with broad
representation including recipients, families, private providers and public
interest representatives."' 83 As noted earlier, this method most closely
resembles a collaborative governance model. This collaborative
governance scheme is similar to the method used by Oregon when it
developed its HIFA waiver. The State of Oregon convened a committee of
twenty-five different stakeholders who designed the HIFA waiver
proposal.' 84 All committee meetings were open to the public and it took
about one year to reach a compromise proposal.'85 The committee decided
not to have a wrap-around coverage feature in the program. 86 According to
one state official, while consumer advocates on the committee did not like
that idea, the advocates saw the compromise solution as better for Oregon.
Therefore it may be presumed that the program has stakeholder support. '
This, this collaborative governance model is likely to facilitate approval of
the waiver proposal by DHHS.' 8 By incorporating a consensus-based
collaboration scheme among stakeholders, state HIFA waiver programs
may not only result in stakeholder buy-in, but it may also satisfy a federal
notice requirement.
3. Access to Private Health Coverage Information
As noted earlier, the HIFA waiver requires states to include a premium
assistance program in its proposal, even if it only amounts to a pilot
program. '" In order to successfully operate premium assistance programs,
states need "detailed information from potentially participating employers
regarding costs, benefit package, employer share of costs and employee
eligibility" in the employer's health plan.'1' Federal law requires states to
collect information with regard to premium assistance programs to
determine the extent of substitution of private coverage for public coverage
(i.e., "crowd out") and whether those programs increase access to
183. DHHS Public Notice Letter, supra note 178.
184. Interview with Jim Edge, supra note 89.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. This assumption was confirmed by Kathleen Farrell of the Department of
Health & Human Services (DHHS), who agreed that collaboration may facilitate approval of
waiver proposals. Telephone Interview with Kathleen Farrell, HIFA Waiver Project Officer,
DHHS (Sept. 11, 2002).
189. See supra text accompanying note 8.
190. CONN. HEALTH POL'Y PROJECT, PREMIUM ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: WHAT ARE THEY
AND COULD THEY HELP CONNECTICUT FAMILIES WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE? 1 (revised
2002), http://www.cthealthpolicy.org/pubs/premium.htm [hereinafter Connecticut Health
Policy Project].
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coverage."9' Wisconsin's BadgerCare program requires such information in
order to verify initial and continued employee eligibility in the program.112
Therefore, access to employer health plan information is important for a
state to verify whether a person is eligible for a Medicaid expansion
program and to have an impact on un-insurance rates.
The ability to access employer health plan information illustrates a larger
problem facing states with regard to employer health plan regulation. Due
to ERISA preemption, states are often left in a regulatory vacuum when
attempting to coordinate and understand public and private health
insurance.'93 State law that explicitly imposes burdens on ERISA plans,
such as reporting to state agencies about their coverage, "is likely to be
preempted by ERISA because it relates to ERISA plans." ' 94  State
collaborations that include employer health plan groups may fill this
regulatory gap, eliminating the need for an ERISA amendment that would
require employers to furnish states with health plan information.' 95 Rather,
employer buy-in of the health coverage expansion program, similar to the
buy-in demonstrated by providers and brokers in the FOCUS and Access
Health programs, may encourage employers to freely provide such
information to states so that states can track program accomplishments.
Not only is state access to employer health plan information important,
but so is employer access to information about the health coverage
expansion program. For example, one of the biggest challenges to the
FOCUS program in San Diego is getting information about the program to
191. 42 C.F.R. § 457.810(d) (2002). A recent study of SCHIP enrollment found that
"growth in children's public coverage was not solely from the ranks of the uninsured, but
that some substitution of public for private coverage occurred." BRADLEY C. STRUNK &
JAMES D. RESCHOVSKY, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYSTEM CHANGE, TRACKING REPORT
No. 4, WORKING FAMILIES' HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE, 1997-2001 3 (2002),
www.hschange.org. Some degree of substitution of SCHIP coverage for employer coverage
is inevitable and not necessarily bad. Private insurance premiums pose a substantial
financial burden on most low-income working families, and substituting public coverage
reduces this burden. Id.
192. Wis. DEP'T OF HEALTH & FAMILY SERVS., BADGERCARE EMPLOYER VERIFICATION
OF INSURANCE COVERAGE (EVIC) FORM, http://www.dhfs.state.wi.us/badgercare/pdfs/
evicformsample.pdf.
193. Peter D. Jacobson, Regulating Health Care: From Self-Regulation to Self-
Regulation?, 26 J. OF HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 1165, 1171 (2001); Trubek, supra note 123,
at 167.
194. PAT BUTLER, ERISA COMPLICATES STATE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO
INDIVIDUAL INSURANCE FOR THE MEDICALLY HIGH RISK, STATE COVERAGE INITIATIVES,
ISSUE BRIEF 4 (Aug. 2000), http://www.statecoverage.org.
195. See, e.g., Barbara J. Zabawa, Breaking through the ERISA Blockade: The Ability of
States to Access Employer Health Plan Information in Medicaid Expansion Initiatives, 5
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 1, 2, 33 (2001) (discussing methods states can use to access
employer health plan information without an amendment to ERISA).
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small businesses.' 96 "Experts on premium assistance programs emphasize
that small employers need more than just financial support," but also
information to purchase insurance effectively and efficiently.'97 FOCUS
relies on collaboration with brokers, chambers of commerce, economic
development councils, and business improvement districts to help educate
small businesses and spread the word about the program. '" Increasing
program participation by employers spreads more policy risk, reduces
adverse selection, and keeps premium rates down.' 99 Furthermore, the
HIFA waiver permits states to design the benefit package for optional
groups based on the benefit package offered by an HMO that has the largest
commercial, non Medicaid enrollment in the state.2 ° Collaboration between
public and private entities would enhance state access to private health plan
information, allowing for more informed decisions when designing the
HIFA waiver benefit plan.
C. Collaborative Governance in HIFA Waiver Proposals
Maximizes the Benefits of Collaboration
The HIFA waiver offers a unique opportunity to maximize the benefits
of collaboration because HIFA would keep both federal and state
governments involved. As one discovers from the collaborative governance
schemes used by FOCUS and Access Health, involving federal and state
governments in the collaborative project has several advantages: (a) access
to greater and more stable funding sources; (b) access to a facilitator that
can collect and distribute data; and (c) an avenue for accountability.
1. Access to Greater and More Stable Funding Sources
As noted earlier, one disadvantage of not coordinating a health coverage
expansion program with Medicaid or SCHIP is lack of access to larger,
more stable funding sources. The designers of the FOCUS program, for
example, financed the program with private funds in order to maintain
flexibility. Specifically, the designers found the wrap-around coverage
requirement administratively burdensome. In addition, part of the success
of the Illinois KidCare program compared to the Wisconsin HIPP program
196. SILOW-CARROLL ET AL., supra note 115, at 46.
197. PETER HARBAGE ET AL., HEALTH POL'Y R&D, THE CALIFORNIA PACADVANTAGE
PREMIUM PROGRAM 23 (March 2002), http://www.healthcareoptions.ca.gov/novOI/
CPPP%20328021.pdf.
198. SILOW-CARROLL ET AL., supra note 115, at 45.
199. See generally id. at 46; Connecticut Health Policy Project, supra note 190, at 3
(describing barriers to implementation that a Connecticut premium assistance program might
encounter).
200. See supra text accompanying note 23.
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can be attributed to the lack of wrap-around coverage in the former
program. The HIFA waiver provided the flexibility in benefit design and
cost-sharing levels that the program developers in the FOCUS and KidCare
programs needed, but were unable to receive prior to the HIFA waiver.
Consequently, future collaborations might be able to design a program like
FOCUS, but with access to federal and state funds.
2. Access to a Facilitator that can Collect and Distribute Data
Involving government agencies in program design would also secure a
facilitator that can collect and distribute data. Because states are required to
submit HIFA waiver proposals to the federal government, the state agency
automatically acts as a facilitator of the collaboration. Collaborative
governance requires a flexible government agency that is engaged in the
negotiation process through facilitating broad participation by stakeholders
and providing information and technical resources when needed.2 0 ' State
gathering and disseminating of data is an essential function in collaborative
governance schemes and is a "shift from management skills on the part of
public servants to enablement skills, the skills of activating, orchestrating,
and modulating these complicated relationships and networks."
2 2
Information gathered from collaborative initiatives will help stakeholders
learn from one another, and help design future legislation. 23 Government
agency involvement is crucial to the learning process that occurs in
collaborative governance schemes because government is a significant
stakeholder in the health care system and has valuable perspectives to share
with other stakeholders.
3. An Avenue for Accountability
State agency facilitation of HIFA waiver collaborations would also help
dispel concerns about accountability. As discussed in Part III, one of the
biggest concerns about collaborative governance is a lack of
accountability. 24  Traditional notions of accountability have included
controlling government agency discretion through notice and comment and
other requirements embodied in the Administrative Procedure Act.
205
201. Freeman, supra note 55, at 22.
202. Lester M. Salamon, The Changing Shape of Government, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
13, 19, 1340 (2001).
203. See Freeman, supra note 55, at 93-94.
204. See, e.g., Jack Beerman, Public Oversight of Public/Private Partnerships, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1357, 1358 (2001) [hereinafter Beerman Remarks].
205. Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An
Introduction, 28 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 1671-72 (2001).
[Vol. 12
34
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 12 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 11
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol12/iss2/11
Making the HIFA Waiver Work
Although it may be difficult to challenge an agency's HIFA waiver program
proposal in court,2°6 judicial review is only one form of accountability." 7
While it is true that collaborative governance schemes give private
stakeholders substantial discretionary authority in designing programs,
accountability within these structures is still possible. The federal
government offers a clear objective through the HIFA waiver of
"encourag[ing] new comprehensive state approaches that will increase the
number of individuals with health insurance coverage within current-level
Medicaid and SCHIP resources., 208 Collaborations that assemble around
this clear objective are more likely to develop strategies to meet the
objective. °
The federal government has also set minimum standards on what groups
should be targeted, benefits that must be covered, and limits on recipient
cost sharing. Because the state agency is the facilitator of the
collaboration and submits the HIFA waiver proposal to the federal
government, the state maintains responsibility for the proposed project and
has the information concerning the project, which should be available
through public records law.211 Furthermore, collaborative governance
demands a shift in thinking about how to achieve accountability,
particularly in light of the complex nature of social welfare program
design.1 2 Accountability can be achieved through "agency and community
206. See supra note 180.
207. Freeman, supra note 55, at 95, 97 (discussing alternatives to traditional
accountability mechanisms, such as government cultivating the capacity of nongovernmental
stakeholders); see Beerman Remarks, supra note 204, at 1357-58 (discussing political
accountability).
208. HCFA HIFA Article, supra note 3, at 1.
209. DAVID MITCHELL, CONTROL WITHOUT BUREAUCRACY 107 (McGraw Hill 1979).
210. HCFA HIFA Article, supra note 3, at 3-4.
211. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 19.35 (2002) (giving individuals the right to inspect
records). "Record" is defined as "any material on which written, drawn, printed, spoken,
visual or electromagnetic information is recorded or preserved, regardless of physical form
or characteristics, which has been created or is being kept by an authority." WIS. STAT. §
19.32(2) (2002). Examples of an "authority" are "a state or local office, elected official,
agency, board, commission, committee, council, department or public body corporate and
politic created by constitution, law, ordinance, rule or order." WIs. STAT. § 19.32(1)
(2002).
212. Freeman, supra note 55, at 95; Salamon, supra note 205, at 1672 (stating that
"instead of thinking of accountability as responsibility to a single dominant unit of
government that authorizes a program, third-party government institutionalizes and
legitimizes multiple perspectives on the goals and purposes of programs"); Barbara L.
Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished Democracy in Local
Government Contracts for Welfare-To-Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1559, 1609
(2001) (arguing that one way to increase accountability in welfare contracts is to include
citizens experienced with TANF and other work-related programs in collaborative schemes,
such as a Community Congress). Professor Bezdek notes that the complex interactions
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participation in corporate decision-making bodies, third-party certification
or auditing of corporate practices, and increased monitoring by and
disclosure directly to, communities as well as agencies.", 213 Thus, a
collaborative governance scheme created around a HIFA waiver proposal
could achieve accountability by ensuring that all stakeholders are
adequately represented with the ability to voice their concerns on health
reform proposals, and that the information gathered at collaborative
meetings would be disclosed to the public. Achieving adequate consumer
advocate involvement in developing a HIFA waiver proposal, however, is
one of several challenges to ensuring success of HIFA waiver collaborative
governance schemes.
V. ENSURING THE SUCCESS OF HIFA WAIVER COLLABORATIVE
GOVERNANCE SCHEMES
Although it could be argued that states should apply collaborative
governance schemes when developing HIFA waiver proposals, there are
some significant challenges to ensuring that the collaborations are
effective. These challenges include: (a) involving consumer representatives
in collaborative efforts; (b) designing a program that is "local" enough to
achieve stakeholder support; and (c) convincing governmental agencies to
adopt and support collaborative models. Each of these challenges is
discussed below, as well as some suggestions on how to meet these
challenges.
A. Adequate Consumer Representation
One of the primary threats to the legitimacy of health reform proposals
created under collaborative governance schemes is the absence of some
stakeholder voices, particularly those representing consumers. While it is
imperative that all stakeholder voices are involved in health reform
proposal development, including various providers, employers, insurers,
regulators, and medical/pharmaceutical device manufacturers, consumers
often have the fewest resources to be effective participants in collaborative
efforts."5 "Consensus-based processes, especially those that envision
continued engagement and responsibility for oversight, require a
between welfare policy and the swirling changes in wage work support the need for
expanding stakeholder involvement in discussing welfare policy. Id.
213. Freeman, supra note 55, at 95.
214. Id. at 81.
215. Id. at 76 (stating that "[elven if they wished to embrace collaboration, however,
chronically understaffed public interest groups cannot afford to participate in multiple
negotiations over multiple policy issues and at the same time continue to fight their
traditional battles in courts and legislatures.").
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tremendous commitment of resources. ' ' 216  Furthermore, informal
collaborative models have "historically worked against [consumer
advocate] interests.",
2
1
7
As noted in Part III, one of the primary objections to collaborative
governance is fear of collusion among stakeholders." 8 Yet, health care
consumer advocate participation in HIFA waiver proposal development is
essential. Consumer advocates could guard against removal of the most
essential services in the new expansion programs while ensuring that the
savings from eliminating nonessential services are used to expand coverage
to new groups. Consumer advocate participation in public-private
collaboration helps guarantee that any cost sharing mechanism is realistic
for low-income people. Thus, consumer advocate participation is a critical
component to the success of collaborative governance structures. However,
it may be difficult to bring consumer groups to the table, either because
they lack resources or are suspicious that such collaborative efforts can
really work in their favor.
State agency facilitation of these collaborative groups is essential to
securing adequate representation of consumer interests.2 9 At the very least,
state agencies could appoint a consumer advocate for underrepresented
groups to participate in these collaborative efforts.2 To strengthen the
technical and financial resources of consumer advocacy groups in these
new governance structures, "agencies could build institutional capacity by
promoting connections between universities and community groups or by
investing directly in community organizations., 2' Capacity-building
reinforces the state agency's role as facilitator of collaborations. Building
institutional capacity may enhance the consumer interest and increase the
knowledge base of consumer advocates with respect to participating in
collaborative health reform efforts. For example, there is a dearth of
community-based consumer advocates who are interested in or understand
private health insurance issues. 2 22 Yet, consumer advocate knowledge of
216. Id.
217. Id. at 75 (referring to lawyers involved in environmental advocacy and how
collaboration has historically worked against them).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
219. Freeman, supra note 55, at 81.
220. Id. at 82.
221. Id. at 81-82.
222. Telephone Interview with Alice Weiss, Director of Health Policy, National
Partnership for Women and Families (Aug. 28, 2002). Proportionately, the number of
private health insurance ombudsman programs pales in comparison to the number of
Medicare or Medicaid programs. Telephone Interview with Jackie Fox, Private Sector
Coordinator, Families USA Health Assistance Partnership Project (July 22, 2002).
Specifically, there are forty official ombudsman programs (20 that actually provide advocacy
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private health insurance issues would be particularly useful in the design of
premium assistance programs under the HIFA waiver. State agencies can
strengthen consumer representation by providing educational resources to
consumer advocates about private health insurance matters, thereby creating
a more balanced discussion between stakeholders.
The study of community organization as applied to health behavior and
education might provide a theoretical framework that state agencies could
use to help mobilize consumer interest in health reform collaborations.
Health education scholars emphasize that to maximize community interest
and involvement in an issue, the change agent must "start where the people
are.''223 That is, the agent must allow the community to identify its needs
224
and concerns. In the area of health reform, there are many consumer-
based community groups that have already identified health coverage
expansion as a central concern. For example, in Wisconsin, groups such as
the Citizen Action Health Care Task Force,225 BadgerCare Coordinating
Network,226 and the Dane County HealthWatch227 meet regularly to discuss
health coverage access issues. State agencies could tap into these existing
groups in their capacity-building efforts and recruit members to participate
in HIFA waiver collaborations.
In addition to state agencies, law school clinics could increase the
number of consumer advocates interested in participating in health reform
collaborations. Although this solution may not address immediate HIFA
waiver proposals, it does offer a solution for future collaborative
governance schemes. Law school clinics that focus on health care
advocacy may broaden future lawyers' views on their role in achieving
justice through collaborations. One clinical law professor notes:
Lawyers and law students, working with leaders from other disciplines
services) for the 126 million people with private health insurance; twenty-five to thirty
official ombudsman programs for the 60 million people on Medicaid; and 1500 SHIP (State
Health Insurance Assistance Programs) programs to assist the approximately 60 million
people on Medicare. Id.
223. Meredith Minkler, Improving Health Through Community Organization, HEALTH
BEHAVIOR & HEALTH ED. 270 (Karen Glanz et al., eds. 1990).
224. Id. at 271.
225. See, e.g., Press Release, Wis. Citizen Action, Citizen Action Says No to Privatizing
Medicare, at http://wica.fp.execpc.com/no-to-privatizingmed.htm (discussing a coalition
comprising of senior citizens, physicians, nurses, labor, health care advocates and farmers).
226. BadgerCare Coordinated Network Mission Statement, supra note 115.
227. ABC FOR HEALTH, HEALTHWATCH COMMITrEES, at http://www.abcforhealth.org/
projects/hw/index.asp (stating that the mission of the HealthWatch Committee of Dane
County is to "advocate for and with low-income families in south-central Wisconsin on
issues relating to access and quality of health care services, with a particular emphasis on
Medicaid managed care.").
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and backgrounds, including representatives from empowered grassroots
organizations, can learn by observing and interacting with expert problem
solvers. Additionally, they may learn to be sensitive to more
collaborative, facilitative forms of lawyering, in which they must adapt to
teamwork, group decision-making, and identifying and solving problems
128directed by others.
As argued in Part IV, health reform proposals demand collaboration
between health system stakeholders. Health advocacy clinics could teach
law students about our health care system by combining individual
consumer representation with participation in community collaborations.
"Individual cases ... can inform lawyers of more systemic problems that
may be at work in the community. ' ' 229 Individual case representation gives
students a valuable health care stakeholder perspective (in addition to their
own consumer status) that can be offered at stakeholder negotiations. Part
IV noted that community collaborations already exist around health system
reform, illustrating the movements down and out. Consequently, health
advocacy clinics should be able to find a number of collaborations that can
involve law students. Through these community collaborations, future
consumer advocates could learn about the health care system from other
stakeholder perspectives, preparing them to be effective advocates for
health reform collaborations.
B. Designing Locally-Based Programs
Another challenge for implementing successful HIFA waiver proposals
through state-based collaborations will be designing a program that meets
the needs of different localities within each state. For example, Wisconsin
learned through its State Planning Grant initiative that "each locality,
whether it be a county, city, provider network or some other entity, faces its
own unique challenges with regard to issues of the uninsured." 3 The
successful FOCUS and Access Health programs described earlier served
geographic areas much smaller than an entire state. The success of these
smaller programs may relate to their ability to provide increased
experimentation and greater transparency and accountability to local
stakeholders."' Furthermore, narrowing the geographic focus of a proposed
228. Andrea M. Seielstad, Community Building as a Means of Teaching Creative,
Cooperative, and Complex Problem Solving in Clinical Legal Education, 8 Clinical L. Rev.
445, 495-496 (2002).
229. Id. at 493.
230. Wis. DEP'T OF HEALTH & FAMILY SERVS., STATE PLANNING GRANT REPORT, supra
note 119, at 59.
231. Trubek, supra note 108, at 599-600.
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program may increase the ability to achieve adequate stakeholder
representation and program buy-in. It may be difficult for a state to
facilitate a collaboration that could agree on a single program that will
satisfy the varying health coverage needs across the state.
One way the states could overcome this difficulty is by submitting
multiple HIFA waiver proposals. The state could convene several
collaborations in different areas across the state so that each locality's
unique health coverage needs are addressed. One DHHS official confirmed
that multiple submissions of HIFA waiver proposals by state region is a
valid use of the HIFA waiver.232 Although multiple HIFA waiver proposal
submissions may be administratively burdensome for state agencies, more
tailored programs to each state region may have a better chance of meeting
the HIFA waiver's goal of expanding health coverage.
C. Government Agency Adoption and Support of Collaborative
Governance Models
Although collaborative governance could satisfy public notice
requirements under the HIFA waiver, there are other methods of public
notice that employ fewer resources and thus may be more attractive to both
state and federal governments. Forming a special commission with broad
representation is only one of several methods that states can use to achieve
public notice.233 Other methods, such as public presentations, forums, or
newspaper notices take less agency time and resources. Collaborative
methods that require consensus take much longer and may create difficulty
in achieving closure.2'3 For example, even in the Access Health program,
which was designed at the county level, the "community almost gave up at
one point prior to implementing Access Health because it was unclear that
local stakeholders would ever agree on how to solve the problem of the
uninsured., 23 The small number of negotiated rulemaking applications by
government agencies also demonstrates the unpopularity of collaborative
devices.236 Surveys of government agencies indicate that the lack of
popularity of negotiated rule-making stems from the belief that other
methods of public notice achieve the same result as collaborative
governance schemes.237 "Negotiated rulemaking merely adds formalities
(e.g., publication of notice regarding committee appointment, use of a
232. Interview with Kathleen Farrell, supra note 188.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 178-79.
234. Telephone Interview with Alice Weiss, supra note 222.
235. SILOW-CARROLL ET AL., supra note 115, at 7.
236. See supra text accompanying note 102.
237. McKinney, supra note 57, at 509-10.
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facilitator, and so on) to regular rulemaking which informally accomplishes
the same end." '238 Specifically, the surveyed agencies stated that informal
conferences and consultations obtained stakeholder viewpoints and advice
with respect to contemplated rulemaking.3
However, such informal consultations may foster adversarialism among
stakeholders and fail to achieve the benefits of collaborative governance.
Collaboration allows stakeholders to learn from one another about the
complex health system during the development of program proposals, rather
than just respond to proposals created by the agency. The success of the
collaborations, described in previous sections, hinged on stakeholder
learning and compromise during program development. Thus, although
collaboration may be more time consuming and perhaps more frustrating
for government agencies to employ, the quality of the program designed
through a collaborative process may be far superior to programs designed
using other public involvement methods.
One might wonder whether the HIFA benefit level and cost-sharing
standards would have faced less opposition from consumer advocates and
providers had DHHS developed those standards using a collaborative
governance mechanism. Instead, DHHS and the federal Office of
Management and Budget worked on the HIFA waiver guidelines without
public input.240 DHHS could incorporate collaborative governance into
HIFA waiver (or future waiver) guideline development, thereby achieving
more stakeholder buy-in and setting an example for states to follow when
they design their waiver proposals.2 '
Furthermore, DHHS could support state-based collaborative efforts by
requiring states to develop HIFA waiver proposals under a collaborative
governance model. Since many of the HIFA waiver's objectives could
benefit from public-private collaboration, DHHS would send a clear
message to states by limiting the public input requirement to only the
collaborative model, rather than the civic republicanism or interest
representation models. Alternatively, DHHS could track how states achieve
public input. Currently, a state verifies with DHHS whether it "has utilized
a public process to allow beneficiaries and other interested stakeholders to
comment on its proposed HIFA demonstration" by checking a box on the
238. Id. at 509.
239. Id. at 509-10.
240. Telephone Interview with Therese Klitenic, Health Insurance Specialist, Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (Sept. 4, 2002).
241. By employing collaborative governance schemes at the federal level, DHHS may
also be able to satisfy its duty to solicit public comment on waiver proposals, as it vowed to
do in its' 1994 Federal Register notice. KFF CHIP Waiver Article, supra note 8, at 12; GAO
REPORT, supra note 33, at 4.
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HIFA waiver application.242 DHHS does not track the types of public input
methods used and the success of those methods. Since states like New
Mexico, Illinois and Oregon have employed collaborative governance
schemes at some point during the development of their HIFA waiver
proposals, it would be interesting to study the success of those programs
compared to states that use less collaborative approaches to achieve public
input.243 If data could show that programs designed under a collaborative
governance approach are more successful at expanding health coverage,
then more states might adopt such approaches when attempting to reform
the health system.
VI. CONCLUSION
Health care costs are soaring higher than any other economic category as
measured by the Consumer Price Index, and this impacts all health care
stakeholders.!" Medicaid programs are not immune to rising costs, and
under difficult economic conditions, states are unlikely to throw more
money at an already enormous program.4 5 Yet solving the growing
uninsured problem is equally important, and many health policy experts
view expanding Medicaid and SCHIP as a means to achieve universal
coverage.
The HIFA waiver is one vehicle that states could use to develop such
expansion programs. The HIFA waiver encourages states to expand health
coverage through flexibility in benefit design and public-private
partnership, while also under budget neutral conditions, at least with respect
to federal funds. Advocates are concerned that the combination of HIFA
waiver budget neutrality, flexibility in structuring benefit and cost-sharing
levels, and tight state budgets will lead to programs that reduce benefits,
raise cost-sharing levels, or limit the number of people eligible for the
242. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., SAMPLE HIFA WAIVER APPLICATION 2 (2001),
at http://cms.hhs.gov/hifalhifatemp.pdf; Interview with Kathleen Farrell, supra note 188.
243. NEW MEXICO GRANT REPORT, supra note 132; Telephone Interview with Jane
Longo, supra note 155; Telephone Interview with Jim Edge, supra note 89.
244. Victoria Colliver, Big Surge in the Cost of Health Care; 4.9% Increase in Past
Year Exceeds Overall Inflation Rate, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 17, 2002, available at
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2002/08/17/BU 126675.DTL.
Nationally, health care costs jumped nearly five percent over the past year, and this increase
was attributed to higher labor costs, skyrocketing prescription drug and hospital expenses,
and increased use of medical services. Id.
245. Robin Toner & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Decade After Health Care Crisis, Soaring
Costs Bring New Strains, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2002/08/1 l/health/ 1HEAL.html; Raymond Scheppaeh, Remarks at the AAHP Conference
on Expanding Coverage for the Uninsured (Sept. 12, 2002) (notes on file with author).
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246program.
However, there is hope that states can expand health coverage under a
collaborative governance approach, as demonstrated by several health
coverage expansion initiatives like FOCUS, Health Access, and Illinois
KidCare. These collaborative efforts could serve as models for HIFA
waiver proposals. As these examples show, true collaboration requires
commitment, learning and compromise, which may be a hard sell to groups
that are accustomed to an interest representation environment and that often
lack resources to adequately bargain in collaborative groups. Yet with
proper state and federal support of collaborative governance, as well as
better training of future health care advocates (such as through law school
clinics), an increased number of underrepresented groups may feel
comfortable collaborating with other health system stakeholders. Indeed,
all stakeholders would benefit from all-inclusive collaboration, because the
health system is too complex for stakeholders to reform on their own.
Many attribute the failure of President Clinton's health reform proposal
to the lack of a collaborative approach in developing the proposal.2 47 "Top-
down social engineering by Washington's central planners is now
intuitively rejected as an anachronism, a hopelessly inefficient throwback to
the bygone era of the Machine Age., 24 '8 The complexity of the U.S. health
care system demands government agencies to adopt networked or
collaborative governance approaches rather than hierarchical approaches
(such as civic republicanism) to reform health care.249
Moreover, collaborative governance under budget neutral conditions
does not have to result in poorer quality programs. Public-private
collaboration could establish greater continuity of coverage for low-income
people. 50 Specifically, collaboration may help Medicaid-based programs
keep up with private health insurance market changes, causing less
traumatic change when people shift from public to private coverage.
Furthermore, by working together, stakeholders may stumble on ideas that
actually improve health within the confines of current funding levels. For
example, collaborators may find that improving the quality of care for one
246. See, e.g., NAT. HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, WHAT IS HIFA AND WHY SHOULD WE BE
CONCERNED (2002), available at http://www.healthlaw.org/waiver.shtml.
247. Michael Rothschild, Why Health Care Reform Died, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1994,
available at http://www.binomics.org/text/resource/articles/ar 026.html; Michael Levin-
Epstein, How We Got it Anyway: The Clinton Health Plan Never Died, MANAGED CARE,
Oct. 2000, at 5, available at http://www.mangedcaremag.conarchives/0010/
0010.clinton.html.
248. Rothschild, supra note 247.
249. Levin-Epstein, supra note 246 (observing that "[t]here is no one in Washington
smart enough to write a health care plan that will solve everybody's problem.").
250. Jacobi, supra note 10, at 115.
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health condition may free up health care dollars to expand coverage to other
individuals.'
Alternatively, stakeholder buy-in may be strong enough to support a fee
on insurers or businesses, or donation of stakeholder resources (as the
brokers and providers did in the FOCUS program) in order to expand
coverage. The flexible conditions under the HIFA waiver attempt to foster
innovative ways to expand coverage with greater efficiency, which is a
laudable goal in a country that spends more per capita on health care
without improved performance on health status measures.252 Increasing
Medicaid budgets is not necessarily a better alternative to expanding health
coverage and improving health, as some advocates suggest.2 3 With
mounting evidence of poor patient quality, such as that discussed by the
Institute of Medicine's Report on patient safety,254 much can still be done to
improve population health within current health care resources.
Health system stakeholders have a wealth of information to offer each
other in a collaborative scheme. The HIFA waiver's flexibility and
emphasis on public-private coordination offers states a perfect opportunity
to learn with other stakeholders and the best chance of closing the health
coverage gap.
251. For example, in Asheville, North Carolina, the city as an employer offered free
medications and supplies to diabetic employees in exchange for employee attendance of a
health class and monthly check in with a pharmacist. See Ceci Connolly, In N.C., Improving
Worker Health - and Cutting Costs, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2002, at A01, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A37834-2002Aug19.html. The project has
saved the city money, as well as reduced emergency room and staff demands in area
hospitals. Id. Such savings could be applied to health coverage expansion programs.
252. Gerard Anderson & Peter Sotir Hussey, Comparing Health System Performance in
OECD Countries, HEALTH AFFAIRS, May/June 2001, at 227-29. Specifically, compared to
other countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), the U.S. spent the most on health care as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product
(13.6% in 1998), but performed relatively poorly on infant mortality, child mortality, and
potential years of life lost and was similar to the median OECD country on life expectancy
and disability-adjusted life expectancy at age sixty. Id.
253. PARK & Ku, supra note 9, at 11 (stating that to relieve states from making the
choice between cutting back on Medicaid and expanding coverage, "the federal government
could instead provide states additional financial resources and incentives.").
254. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN:
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, (LINDA T. KOHN ET AL., eds., 2000), available at
http://books.nap.edu/html/to-err-is-human/Exsum.PDF. According to the Institute of
Medicine report, between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans die each year as a result of medical
errors. Id. at 1. This costs the nation between $17 billion and $29 billion, not even counting
errors that occur outside the hospital system. Id. "Errors are also costly in terms of
opportunity costs. Dollars spent on having to repeat diagnostic tests or counteract adverse
drug events are dollars unavailable for other purposes." Id. at 2. As a result, the IOM report
states "it would be irresponsible to expect anything less than a 50% reduction in errors over
five years." Id. at 3.
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